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THE LEGAL ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE:  
THE ROLE OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 
Kevin Outterson* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Antibiotic effectiveness is a common pool resource that can be 
prematurely depleted through resistance.  Some experts warn that we 
may face a global ecological collapse in antibiotic effectiveness. 
Conventional wisdom argues for more intellectual property rights 
to speed the creation of new antibiotics.  Recent theoretical literature 
suggests that conservation-based approaches may yield superior 
results.  This Article describes a novel typology for organizing these 
emerging theories and provides an early empirical test of these models 
using proprietary data on the sales of vancomycin, an important 
hospital antibiotic for the last three decades. 
The results challenge the assumptions in several models and will 
force a re-evaluation of the role of intellectual property rights in 
antibiotic resistance and conservation.  In particular, insurance 
reimbursement may be a more effective policy lever than patent law to 
preserve antibiotic effectiveness. 
 
I.     THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTIBIOTIC COMMONS 
 
Antibiotics may be the greatest single medical success of the 
twentieth century.   But this achievement rests on an insecure 
foundation.  As antibiotics are used, they create evolutionary pressure 
that threatens their undoing through resistance.1  In a post-antibiotic 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  My thanks to Dr. Marc 
Lipsitch of the Harvard School of Public Health for his assistance in the biology of resistance, 
and Aaron Kesselheim, M.D., at the Harvard Medical School, for our joint work relating to 
innovative coordination mechanisms for antimicrobial conservation.   
  Other reviewers include Michael Meurer, Ursula Theuretzbacher, Gary Lawson and 
Wendy Gordon.  This Article was presented at the Healthcare Fragmentation Conference at 
Harvard Law School in June 2008; the Boston University Law School faculty workshop in 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492150
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world,2 some of the advances in health over the previous seventy-five 
years would be threatened.3  The edifice of modern medicine assumes 
the efficacy of antibiotic therapies as a foundational tool. 
Antibiotic effectiveness is correctly viewed as a valuable common 
pool resource4 akin to verdant forests, productive fisheries, and a stable 
Greenland Ice Sheet.  Common pools are prone to depletion and 
collapse through uncoordinated withdrawals.  In the case of antibiotics, 
withdrawals occur as antibiotic resistance grows through use and 
misuse.  We face a tragedy of the antibiotic commons as uncoordinated 
use and misuse of precious antibiotics may prematurely destroy these 
important drugs.5 
 
September 2008; the Drug Policy Research Group at Harvard Medical School in October 2008; 
and at several meetings of the Drug Resistance Working Group at the Center for Global 
Development.  This work is supported by research grants from The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, Resources for the Future; the Boston University School of Law; the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation; and an in-kind grant from IMS Health.  
 1 The relationships between use and resistance are not linear and are occasionally negatively 
correlated.  Marc Lipsitch, The Rise and Fall of Antimicrobial Resistance, 9 TRENDS IN 
MICROBIOLOGY 438, 441-42 (2001). 
 2 Per Nordberg, Dominique L. Monnet & Otto Cars, Antibacterial Drug Resistance, in 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PRIORITY MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD: PUBLIC 
HEALTH APPROACHES TO INNOVATION ch. 6.1 (2004), available at http://archives.who.int/ 
prioritymeds/report/index.htm; Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline—Challenges, Costs, 
and Values, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 523 (2004) (“Currently, the antibiotic era is 
threatened . . . .”). 
 3 Many commentators focus on the devastating return of infectious diseases in a post-
antibiotic era.  See, e.g., RAMANAN LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., EXTENDING THE CURE: POLICY 
RESPONSES TO THE GROWING THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 1-28, and sources cited 
therein (2007); William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: 
Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), 
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1436154, at 3-4.  But the majority of the decline in 20th-
century infectious disease mortality in the United States occurred before the introduction of 
antibiotics.  Gregory L. Armstrong, Laura A. Conn & Robert W. Pinner, Trends in Infectious 
Disease Mortality in the United States During the 20th Century, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 61, 63 
fig.1 (1999) (showing a decline in infectious disease mortality rates in the United States from 
about 800 per 100,000 persons in 1900 to less than 400 per 100,000 persons prior to 1935).  
Nevertheless, much of the current practice of medicine in U.S. hospitals and ambulatory surgical 
centers depends upon effective antibiotics and would undergo radical changes in a post-antibiotic 
era. 
 4 Several authors have written of antimicrobial effectiveness as a common pool resource.  
See LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3; Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: 
Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 611 (2005); Kevin Outterson, Julie Balch 
Samora & Karen Keller-Cuda, Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public 
Health?, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559 (2007) [hereinafter Outterson et al., Antimicrobial 
Patents]; Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 78-80 (2004) [hereinafter 
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain].  Some consider antimicrobial effectiveness a public good.  
See, e.g., RACHEL NUGENT ET AL., CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, PROTECTING DRUG 
EFFICACY AS A GLOBAL HEALTH GOOD: DRAFT REPORT OF THE DRUG RESISTANCE WORKING 
GROUP (Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 8.  But antibiotics 
themselves are not public goods: Consumption is rivalrous through resistance, and exclusion is 
possible through global intellectual property law. 
 5 For a general introduction to the tragedy of the commons, see Randall R. Dipert, 
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This Article focuses on three important policy questions 
concerning resistance.  The first is the tension between production of 
new antibiotics and conservation of existing drugs.  At first blush, both 
seem to be laudable goals, but in many ways conservation and 
production work at cross purposes, and difficult choices must be made 
between them.  For example, antibiotic conservation suppresses demand 
for antibiotics by controlling infectious diseases and curbing 
inappropriate use.  Viewed from the perspective of new drugs, these 
programs undercut market incentives by dampening future demand.  
This is known as the “conservation dampens production” hypothesis, as 
discussed at length below.6  But from the perspective of public health, 
infection control is an unqualified success when infections are 
prevented.   Another important hypothesis, “patent holder 
conservation,”7 posits that patent holders will be careful stewards of 
antibiotics, promoting conservation through patent law.  This Article 
explores these concepts and suggests that greater emphasis should be 
placed on conservation, but not necessarily through patent law. 
The second question is the relationship between resistance and 
innovation.  The conventional wisdom assumes that resistance is a 
problem in antibiotic innovation, but this Article argues that resistance 
may actually stimulate innovation rather than retard it.8  Resistance 
makes highly effective antibiotics obsolete over time, which clears the 
competitive field before a new drug enters the market.  This process of 
creative destruction may favor innovation. 
The final question evaluates the policy levers employed in the 
battle against antibiotic resistance.  This Article questions the current 
reliance on patent law to solve antibiotic resistance problems.  For 
example, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) correctly 
identifies the need for effective antibiotic therapies, but has mistakenly 
called for significant changes in patent law to remedy the problem, 
including patent extensions and wildcard patent extensions9 for 
 
Sidestepping the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE COMMONS: ITS TRAGEDIES AND OTHER 
FOLLIES 27 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 2001); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 6 See infra Part II.C.  
 7 See id. 
 8 This is the “resistance stimulates innovation” hypothesis, discussed infra Parts II.C and 
III.C. 
 9 A wildcard patent extension grants additional years of patent life on any drug of a 
company’s choice if the company achieves some socially desirable goal⎯in this case, 
development of a novel antibiotic.  Wildcard patent extensions have generated sharp academic 
exchanges in recent years.  See Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means to 
Incentivize Research and Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240 (2009) 
(supporting wildcard patent extensions); Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy for a 
New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264 (2009) (critiquing Sonderholm); Outterson et al., 
Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 561-62 (finding wildcard patent extensions to be 
inefficient, unfair, and possibly unconstitutional); Brad Spellberg, Antibiotic Resistance and 
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antibiotics.10  Patent law mechanisms are ill-suited to address this 
problem, in part because pharmaceutical prices in the United States are 
not really set by the market.11  To the extent that market-based pricing is 
an important element of the patent system,12 its absence in 
pharmaceuticals is quite troubling.  If the primary market signals are 
muddled or broken, additional patent-based programs should not be 
rolled out before the reimbursement system is fixed.13 
Insurance reimbursement is a powerful tool that is not well 
deployed to promote continued antibiotic effectiveness.  As discussed 
infra Part III.C, reimbursement has created both helpful and perverse 
financial incentives.  The former improves access to drugs through third 
party reimbursement; the latter hinders conservation and allows 
hospitals and physicians to receive additional payments for out-of-
control infections and unnecessary prescriptions.  Private incentives and 
social goals are seriously mismatched.  But perhaps it is easier to fix the 
reimbursement system than to implement effective patent-based 
solutions.  If so, our policy focus should be on reimbursement rather 
than patents. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II maps the theoretical 
terrain surrounding the tragedy of the antibiotic commons, with an 
emphasis on organizing existing approaches into a new typology, found 
in Table 1.14  The goal of this exercise is to place existing work into six 
theoretical categories and to identify missing elements in the current 
literature.  Seven key hypotheses from the most relevant theories are 
then collected and summarized in Table 2.15  For example, one 
hypothesis is called “patent holder waste” because it posits that an 
antibiotic patent holder, facing imminent expiration of its patent, may 
be inclined to waste the asset (from society’s viewpoint) through 
overzealous marketing before the patent enters the public domain.  The 
patent holder waste hypothesis, if proven, offers patent law as a possible 
antibiotic conservation tool: With a longer patent, the drug company 
 
Antibiotic Development, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 211-12 (2008) [hereinafter Spellberg, 
Antibiotic Resistance] (critiquing Outterson et al.); Kevin Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance and 
Antibiotic Development—Author’s Reply, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 212-14 (2008) 
[hereinafter Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance] (responding to Spellberg’s critique); B. Spellberg et 
al., Societal Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension Legislation to Spur Critically 
Needed Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167 (2007) [hereinafter Spellberg et al., Societal 
Costs Versus Savings] (supporting wildcard patent extensions for antibiotics). 
 10 INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS ANTIBIOTIC DISCOVERY 
STAGNATES . . . A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 22-26 (2004) [hereinafter BAD BUGS].  This 
report was a call to action from the leading infectious diseases society in the United States. 
 11 See infra Part III.C. 
 12 See infra Part III.C. 
 13 Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent 
Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 1056-57 (2008). 
 14 See infra Part II.B tbl.1. 
 15 See infra Part II.C tbl.2. 
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could manage the antibiotic more in keeping with society’s long-term 
interests.  This Article casts some doubt on the validity of the patent 
holder waste hypothesis, as well as several other proffered hypotheses. 
Since context matters, Part III is more practical in orientation, 
exploring the institutional and legal structures in the U.S. market that 
directly affect continued antibiotic effectiveness, including the central 
role of reimbursement (in Part III.C).  This Part also draws heavily upon 
the biomedical evidence on resistance, since resistance involves 
biologically complex systems with many heterogeneous elements.  To 
adequately understand and model resistance, understanding both the 
biological and legal ecology is vital. 
Part IV is the case study on vancomycin, using proprietary sales 
and volume data for this important antibiotic over the past few decades.  
Vancomycin sales and patent data are evaluated with respect to two of 
the most important conditions related to antibiotic resistance: 
Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD) and methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).  The data are placed in the 
context of U.S. markets for antibiotics, including the relevant patents 
and insurance reimbursement systems. 
The case study challenges several key hypotheses from Table 2.16  
For example, the “resistance stimulates innovation” hypothesis is found 
to be supported, upending conventional wisdom.  Resistance appears to 
have an overall positive effect on antibiotic production, at least from the 
public health perspective.  On the other hand, the vancomycin case 
study does not support the “patent holder waste” hypothesis, since 
limited patent terms do not appear to have encouraged vancomycin 
waste.  The evaluation of the seven hypotheses in light of the case study 
is found in Table 3.17 
This Article also challenges the assumption that intellectual 
property law is the key policy lever for antibiotic markets.  The 
language of intellectual property has been an important framing tool,18 
but other market structures are equally or more important for antibiotics, 
especially insurance reimbursement.   If we repair the broken 
reimbursement system for antibiotics, patent changes may not be 
necessary at all. 
The stakes are huge for getting these policies right; the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America warns that the alternative may be a global 
ecological collapse in antibiotic effectiveness.19 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 See infra Part IV.C tbl.3. 
 18 Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). 
 19 See BAD BUGS, supra note 10. 
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II.     LEGAL RESPONSES TO COMMON POOL DEPLETION PROBLEMS 
 
Tragedies of the commons can be addressed through law.  Three 
legal mechanisms have been used in other contexts: private coordination 
through property law, public coordination through regulation, and 
private coordination through contract. 
 
A.     Property, Regulation, and Contract 
 
The first mechanism is privatization—enclosure of the commons—
through property rights.20  The archetype is the overgrazed common 
pasture facing ecological collapse.  The common pasture first becomes 
private property, and then the new owner manages the resource with 
property law.  The consolidated owner or firm, it is hoped, manages the 
property for long-term sustainability.  The “patent holder conservation” 
hypothesis is an application of this narrative, substituting public domain 
antibiotics for common pastureland.21  We will call this approach 
“property.” 
The second legal mechanism is public coordination through 
regulation.  The federal and state regulation of air pollution is a prime 
example.  The atmosphere itself is not easily privatized, and the number 
of polluters is too large for private coordination, so regulation is a likely 
tool.22  We will call this approach “regulation.” 
The final legal mechanism is private coordination through contract.  
When transaction costs are low enough, contract can be used for private 
coordination, often in conjunction with property law.23  In addition, 
groups can sometimes manage common resources through informal 
mechanisms to prevent uncoordinated use and withdrawals.24  With due 
regard for the potential for informal coordination, we will nevertheless 
call this approach “contract.” 
When property, regulation, and contract tools are all plausible 
options, the ideal policy surely depends on the context.  For some 
 
 20 For a critical view, see James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003). 
 21 See infra Part II.C. 
 22 If one focuses solely on downwind property owners, and their number is small, pollution 
externalities could be resolved in contract.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  When the number of parties and transaction costs grow, contract evolves 
into either the firm or social contract (i.e., regulation). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1994); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
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common pools such as pastureland, property rights may be an effective 
primary regime.  For the Greenland Ice Sheet, direct property rights are 
an unlikely path to success.  Even if we were willing and able to 
privatize the Greenland Ice Sheet, most of the damages and benefits 
would not easily be internalized to the owner.  The owner would find it 
difficult to collect fees from the low-lying regions of the world 
threatened by a rise in sea levels and would find it equally difficult to 
influence the behaviors of billions of people partially responsible for 
climate change in order to protect the integrity of the common pool 
resource.  This problem appears to be a candidate for global regulation.  
Nevertheless, property rights and contract may still play a prominent 
part.   Property rights might slow global climate change through 
property-based contract schemes like carbon “cap and trade” 
programs.25 
In some contexts, mixed approaches dominate.  Many forests are a 
mix of public and private ownership, but even privately owned forests 
are sometimes regulated for various public benefits.   Multiple 
companies may own and tap large pools of underground oil, but legal 
regulation can attempt to protect the joint oil pool when private contract 
falls short.26  Other examples could be offered, but in each one the ideal 
mix of property rights, regulation, and contract is likely to vary 
considerably according to the context.  As Coase noted: 
[D]irect governmental regulation will not necessarily give better 
results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the 
firm.  But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an 
improvement in economic efficiency.  This would seem particularly 
likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large 
number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of 
handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.27 
We will return to context in Part III. 
 
B.     A Legal Typology of Resistance 
 
Like the collapse of global fisheries,28 we may be experiencing an 
ecological crisis through biological resistance.29  Legal institutions must 
 
 25 U.S. State Governments Join International Carbon Action Partnership on Global Cap-and-
Trade Carbon Markets, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 162 (John R. Crook ed., 2008) (describing the use of 
cap-and-trade carbon markets to reduce global carbon emissions).  Bill Sage and David Hyman 
have discussed this concept for antibiotics as well.  Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 16. 
 26 See, e.g., EUGENE KUNTZ ET AL., LAW OF OIL AND GAS (2009). 
 27 Coase, supra note 22, at 18.  Coase also notes a third option: doing nothing at all when the 
costs of regulation exceed the costs of the underlying problem. 
 28 Plenty More Fish in the Sea?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009, Special Report, at 10. 
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evolve to confront this crisis, with the goal being continued antibiotic 
effectiveness.  The conventional prescriptions in the policy literature are 
familiar: (1) public health regulation to dampen demand and conserve 
existing antibiotics (conservation or demand-side tools);30 and (2) 
incentives to create new antibiotics, typically through intellectual 
property rights and government grants (production or supply-side 
tools).31 
Conservation/Production are a related dyad for antibiotic common 
pools, similar to the Property/Regulation/Contract coordination 
discussion immediately above.  Mapping these elements onto a simple 
grid creates the following Table 1.  This approach organizes existing 
tools into six sectors.  Any particular sector should not be mistaken as 
the ultimate objective.  The policy goal is not more drug patents (Sector 
2), better conservation programs (Sector 3), or more efficient insurance 
reimbursement (Sector 5), but the continued availability of effective 
antibiotic treatments when needed. 
 
 29 See BAD BUGS, supra note 10. 
 30 For a classic book length introduction, see STUART B. LEVY, THE ANTIBIOTIC PARADOX: 
HOW THE MISUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS DESTROYS THEIR CURATIVE POWERS (2d ed. 2002); see also 
DEPT. OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 
(2001).  For a recent review, see Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic 
Resistance—Innovative Strategies to Promote Continued Antibiotic Effectiveness, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. (forthcoming 2010). 
 31 See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 927 (2004) (presenting an authoritative overview on the relationship between 
patented drug prices and R&D).  Otto Cars and colleagues advocate both approaches in concert.  
Otto Cars et al., Meeting the Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 726 (2008). 
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Table 1.  Legal Approaches to Continued Antibiotic Effectiveness 
 
 Conservation Production 
Property 
  
1. Patents as conservation 
tools to privately 
constrain demand. 
2. Patents as incentives to 
bring new antibiotics to 
market. 
Regulation 
 
3. Public health infection 
control and regulatory 
antibiotic stewardship 
programs regulate 
demand for antibiotics.  
4. FDA regulations could 
be relaxed to speed 
approval of new antibiotics.  
Tax subsidies support 
antibiotic research and 
development. 
Contract 5. Insurance 
reimbursement could be 
deployed as a 
conservation tool. 
6. Prizes, grants, and 
generous reimbursement 
could support antibiotic 
research and development. 
 
This typology can help identify policy gaps among the six sectors.  
For example, it is often assumed that antibiotic production incentives 
are largely property-based, rooted in intellectual property law to foster 
the introduction of new antibiotics,32 but the production column of 
Table 1 identifies other options, including modifying U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations and creating prizes and grants 
for new antibiotics.  Conversely, antibiotic conservation programs are 
generally described as regulatory approaches, without sufficient 
discussion of possible property-based and contract-based conservation 
tools.33  The conservation column of Table 1 identifies some alternative 
approaches, including insurance reimbursement as a contract-based tool. 
More fundamentally, it is important to view production and 
conservation as separate but interrelated realms and to focus appropriate 
attention on both.  Our energy policy once suffered from a singular 
focus on production and neglected conservation.  Today, a broader 
consensus supports government intervention in favor of both production 
and conservation.34  Politicians and economists debate their relative 
importance but generally support incentives for both as complimentary 
strategies.  For antibiotic policy, a similar consensus has yet to translate 
into effective action.  Sector 3 public health programs, such as hospital 
infection control and rational use of antibiotics, are commonly 
 
 32 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10. 
 33 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 30. 
 34 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
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applauded, but the structure of our health care system funnels 
remarkably little money to them.  As a result, policy options in Sectors 
3 and 5, such as reimbursement for conservation, are starved for cash.35  
The U.S. health care system spends most of the relevant financial 
resources in Sector 2, to the detriment of the other policy options. 
In a similar fashion, most of the relevant legal scholarship has 
focused on IP solutions in Sector 2, such as drug patents.36  Patents are 
particularly valuable for the pharmaceutical industry.37  Patents and 
intellectual property law allow pharmaceutical companies to earn excess 
profits from health insurance companies, government health programs, 
and consumers.  Patent-based drug companies can charge higher prices 
during periods of marketing exclusivity,38 which in turn support 
investments in research and development (R&D).  Patents may also 
 
 35 Otto Cars et al., Meeting the Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, 337 BRITISH MED. J. 726, 
726 (2008) (“However, sufficient financial and human resources to implement the strategy were 
never provided.”); see also NUGENT ET AL., supra note 4, at 35-38; Richard S. Saver, In Tepid 
Defense of Population Health: Physicians and Antibiotic Resistance, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 431 
(2008) (emphasizing physician demand-side conservation issues). 
 36 For an overview, see COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. 
HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 22 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ 
ENPublicHealthReport.pdf [hereinafter WHO CIPIH Report].  For an introduction to the legal 
literature, see Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health 
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended 
TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Verses Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).  For an introduction to the 
economic literature, see Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247-48 (1994); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77 (1977); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent 
Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 427 (1972). 
 37 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL JAMES MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 14 (2008). 
 38 In addition to patents, drug company products may enjoy additional periods of marketing 
exclusivity based on regulatory standards.  In the United States, the FDA often manages these 
additional periods of exclusivity.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (establishing general five-year 
period of data exclusivity); The Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2006) (granting 
seven years of data exclusivity for qualifying orphan products); U.S. FDA, DEPT. HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERV., THE PEDIATRIC EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION: JANUARY 2001 STATUS REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval 
Process/DevelopmentResources/UCM049915.pdf (granting six-month extension for pediatric 
testing).  Data exclusivity periods operate independently of patent law and have been the subject 
of several controversial bilateral trade negotiations.  See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, BRIEFING 
NOTE, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AT RISK ACROSS THE GLOBE: WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR IN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES 4-6 (2004); Ken J. Harvey et al., Will the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Undermine the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?, 
181 MED. J. AUSTL. 256 (2004); Kevin Outterson, Agony in the Antipodes: The Generic Drug 
Provisions in the Australia–USA Free Trade Agreement, 2 J. GENERIC MED. 316 (2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787224; M. Kevin Outterson, 
Free Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 181 MED. J. AUSTL. 260 (2004); Teva Opposes 10-Year Data 
Exclusivity Provision for Israel, GENERIC LINE, May 5, 2004; Hadas Manor, US to Israel: Grant 
5-Year Exclusivity for Ethical Drugs, GLOBES ONLINE, July 1, 2004, http://www.globes.co.il/ 
serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=810543&fid=942. 
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create access problems.39  This literature is valuable and interesting, but 
generally does not analyze antibiotics separately. 
More novel and germane to antibiotic resistance has been the 
attempt by a leading professional society and others to expand patent 
law as an incentive for new antimicrobial production, including 
introducing longer antibiotic patents.40  The Infectious Diseases Society 
of America has suggested extensive patent changes without much 
relevant analysis of the interaction between patent law and antibiotic 
markets.  Much more sophisticated analysis has come from the 
Extending the Cure report issued in 2007 by Anup Malani and Ramanan 
Laxminarayan under the auspices of the think tank Resources for the 
Future.41 
This focus on intellectual property rights is certainly 
understandable given the value of patents to pharmaceutical 
innovation,42 but Sector 2 is just one of six possible solution spaces for 
continued antibiotic effectiveness.  In recent years, some authors have 
explored prize-based R&D approaches (Sector 6) with a range of quite 
remarkable proposals.  Two of the most innovative thinkers in this area 
are James Love and Tim Hubbard,43 and many other scholars are 
working on prize-related approaches to pharmaceutical innovation 
generally, including law professors Terry Fisher and Talha Syed, 
philosopher Thomas Pogge, and economist Aiden Hollis.44  Antibiotic 
 
 39 See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in 
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005). 
 40 BAD BUGS, supra note 10, at 4-5 (supporting patent extensions, wildcard patents, and other 
patent and tax-based incentives to promote antimicrobial development); LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 9-10 (listing patent modifications as potential policy options to incentive new 
antimicrobial development and discussing conservation); Spellberg, Antibiotic Resistance, supra 
note 9; Spellberg et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings, supra note 9; George H. Talbot et al., Bad 
Bugs Need Drugs: An Update on the Development Pipeline from the Antimicrobial Availability 
Task Force of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
657, 666 (2006) (supporting legislation proposed in Congress with the support of the Infectious 
Disease Society of America).  But see Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 
561-62 (criticizing the wild-card patent proposal); Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance, supra note 9. 
 41 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 7. 
 42 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37. 
 43 James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for 
Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 147 (2004); James Love, Prizes, Not Prices, to 
Stimulate Antibiotic R&D, SCIENCE & DEV. NETWORK, Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.scidev.net/ 
en/health/antibiotic-resistance/opinions/prizes-not-prices-to-stimulate-antibiotic-r-d-.html.  But 
see Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act 
of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25 (2007); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Patents 
and R&D Incentives: Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing 
Pharmaceutical R&D 2 (June 25, 2004), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/ 
Submission3.pdf. 
 44 For book-length treatments of prize proposals, see WILLIAM W. FISHER, III & TALHA 
SYED, DRUGS, LAW, AND THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (forthcoming 2010), 
available at http://www.tfisher.org/Drugs%20Contents.htm (selected chapters); AIDEN HOLLIS & 
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prizes might be offered for novel first-in-class drugs with powerful 
mechanisms against resistance or for antibiotics targeting specific 
resistance pathogens for which the drug pipeline appears to be 
inadequate.45  Another possible antibiotic prize mechanism would 
purchase the patent rights to a novel antibiotic, holding the drug in a 
“Strategic Antibiotic Reserve.”46  The drug would not be marketed, and 
saved for only the most urgent cases, until such time as resistance to 
other drugs made it necessary to resort to the reserved drug.47 
In Sector 3, the medical literature is quite extensive on antibiotic 
conservation programs,48 but the legal scholarship is much thinner.  A 
recent effort by Richard Saver admirably moves these Sector 3 issues 
forward, with a strong emphasis on the role of physicians in managing 
the demand for antibiotics.49  Physicians often exhibit agency problems 
when their desire to make money conflicts with the best treatments for 
their patients; with antibiotics, an additional problem arises because the 
best course of treatment for a particular patient might impose a small 
but cumulatively significant cost on society through resistance.50 
 
THOMAS POGGE, INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL HEALTH, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW 
MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL (2008); MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, 
STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED 
DISEASES (2004); see also William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Health Care: 
Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2007); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the 
Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRITISH MED. J. 1279 (2006).  The economic and health 
policy literature is also significant.  See, e.g., Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward 
Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK QUARTERLY 213 (1995); 
Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & 
ECON. 525 (2001); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and 
Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983); Aiden Hollis, An Efficient Reward System 
for Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005), http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf.  
For a more philosophical approach, see Thomas Pogge, Harnessing the Power of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, in THE POWER OF PILLS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING, AND PRICING 142 (Jillian Claire Cohen et al. eds., 2006). 
 45 For a list of likely pathogens for such a prize, see Louis B. Rice, Federal Funding for the 
Study of Antimicrobial Resistance in Nosocomial Pathogens: No ESKAPE, 197 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1079 (2008). 
 46 The analogy is to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, an idea I floated in 2005 and fleshed out 
in 2007.  Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 100 (“Postponing discovery of 
new antibiotics might be the best course so long as the present drugs are better managed.”); id. at 
116 (“Possible market-making techniques include patent buyouts, prizes, strategic stockpiles, and 
contractual purchase commitments.”); Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 
564 (not using the term, but calling for paying patent owners to hold important antibiotics “off-
market as a conservation plan”); see also Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 9.  Bill Sage 
and David Hyman are also beginning to discuss this idea, see Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 21, 
and other researchers may have used similar terms as well. 
 47 For a discussion of vancomycin as an accidental model for the Strategic Antibiotic 
Reserve, see infra Part IV.C. 
 48 For a recent review of the medical literature, see Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, 
at 6-7. 
 49 Saver, supra note 35 (emphasizing physician demand-side conservation issues). 
 50 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 6-11 (discussing physician agency issues). 
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This brings us to Sector 1, the intersection of conservation and 
property rights.  Some Sector 1 models look to patent law to solve 
antibiotic conservation problems.  An obvious solution would be to 
patent technologies that promote antibiotic conservation, such as rapid 
diagnostic tests that would permit a physician to specifically diagnose 
an infection in the office.  The physician could then prescribe the 
appropriate antibiotic for the specific infection, or, if the infection was 
not bacterial, avoid an unnecessary prescription altogether.  Another 
example is a catheter with patented anti-bacterial properties.  Avoiding 
hospital-associated infections with improved catheters would reduce 
demand for antibiotics. 
A more adventurous Sector 1 idea is to expand antibiotic patent 
rights as a conservation tool, allowing patent owners to more fully 
control the use of their products.51  The basic proposal is to expand 
private property rights in antibiotics in order to promote conservation, 
resolving the tragedy of the antibiotic commons through enclosure and 
private ordering.  Beginning in 2005, Eric Kades52 suggested that 
patent-based property rights in antibiotic innovation lead to wasteful 
overuse as patent expirations approach.53  He called for much longer 
patent terms in order to give the patent holder a long-term perspective 
on the antibiotic patent.54  Later that same year, I analogized this 
situation to the ancient tort of waste, a classic temptation as a time-
limited property right nears expiration.55  We built upon prior work of 
economists and others working on patent-based incentives relating to 
antibiotic conservation.56  In general, this work has been theoretical 
 
 51 It appears that Kades introduced this concept to the legal literature.  Kades, supra note 4, at 
635-43, 653-59; see also LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 20; Carolyn Fischer, Does the 
Monopolist Care About Resistance?, in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND 
PESTICIDES: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 288-92 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed., 2003) [hereinafter 
BATTLING RESISTANCE]; John B. Horowitz & H. Brian Moehring, How Property Rights and 
Patents Affect Antibiotic Resistance, 13 HEALTH ECON. 575, 577-78 (2004); Ramanan 
Laxminarayan, How Broad Should the Scope of Antibiotic Patents Be?, 84 AM. J. 
AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1287 (2002) [hereinafter Laxminarayan, Scope of Antibiotic Patents]; 
Douglas Noonan, An Economic Model of a Genetic Resistance Commons: Effects of Market 
Structure Applied to Biotechnology in Agriculture, in BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra, at 263-87; 
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 80. 
 52 Kades, supra note 4. 
 53 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 12; Kades, supra note 4, at 629-38. 
 54 Kades, supra note 4, at 653-59.  Success of the patent extension strategy as a conservation 
device would require drug companies to value future sales over present sales.  If the discount rate 
was high (as in an inflationary economy), present sales would be strongly preferred.  Even in 
normal economic times, future sales must be discounted.  Therefore, as a conservation measure, 
patent extension will be least valuable in the early years of marketing an antibiotic, and more 
valuable if added when the patent faced immanent expiration.  The effect on resistance is 
unknown. 
 55 Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 81-86; see also Outterson et al., 
Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563. 
 56 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 9-10, 12-13; Cars et al., supra note 35; Fischer, 
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rather than empirical.  In two recent articles, I offered some anecdotal 
examples that might be considered evidence of the “patent holder 
waste” hypothesis,57 but hard data was lacking.  This Article is the first 
to test these emerging theories with empirical data from an important 
hospital-based antibiotic—vancomycin. 
 
C.     Hypotheses Concerning Antibiotic Production and Conservation 
 
Generally speaking, knowledge is non-excludible (inappropriable) 
and nonrivalrous (inexhaustible); patent law seeks to solve the free-rider 
problem by awarding market exclusivity to the patent holder.  Patent 
disclosure publicizes useful knowledge, and a patent’s expiration makes 
such knowledge fully available to the public domain.  Since knowledge 
is generally not rivalrous, temporary exclusive use does not diminish the 
public domain.  
Antibiotics depart from the general case because antibiotic 
innovation is potentially exhaustible (rivalrous).  Antibiotic innovation 
is exhaustible when use creates resistance and resistance degrades 
utility.  I have reviewed the literature and discussed these questions at 
length in prior articles,58 but will briefly highlight seven important 
hypotheses that relate to these questions and place them in the context 
of the six sectors in Table 2 infra.  Since these hypotheses are being 
proffered collectively for the first time, this Part is primarily descriptive. 
 
supra note 51; Horowitz & Moehring, supra note 51; Ramanan Laxminarayan, Introduction: On 
the Economics of Resistance, in BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra note 51, at 9; Laxminarayan, 
Scope of Antibiotic Patents, supra note 51; Stéphane Mechoulan, Market Structure and 
Communicable Diseases, 40 CAN. J. ECON. 468 (2007); Noonan, supra note 51; Tomas J. 
Philipson & Stéphane Mechoulan, Intellectual Property and External Consumptive Effects: 
Generalizations from Pharmaceutical Markets 9, 13-14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9598, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9598.pdf?new_ 
window=1 (arguing that optimal patent life is infinite if the good creates negative externalities, 
citing antibiotic resistance as one example).  These authors also draw on two older articles.  See 
Gardner Brown & David F. Layton, Resistance Economics: Social Cost and the Evolution of 
Antibiotic Resistance, 1 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 349, 351 (1996); Clem Tisdell, Exploitation of 
Techniques That Decline in Effectiveness with Use, 37 PUB. FIN. 428, 436 (1982). 
 57 Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563.  For a description of the 
“patent holder waste” hypothesis, see infra Part II.C. 
 58 Id.; Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 76-78. 
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Table 2.  Hypotheses From Legal and Economic Theory on 
Continued Antibiotic Effectiveness 
 
Hypothesis Sector 
H1.  Patent holder waste  1 
H2.  Patent holder conservation  1 
H3.  Patent incentives are inadequate for production  2 
H4.  Resistance stimulates innovation  2 
H5.  Conservation dampens production 3 
H6.  Excessive regulation dampens production  4 
H7.  Antibiotic externalities are predominantly negative All 
 
The first two hypotheses—patent holder waste (H1) and patent 
holder conservation (H2)—are important foundations for property-
based conservation efforts in Sector 1.   The third and fourth 
hypotheses—patent incentives are inadequate for production (H3) and 
resistance stimulates innovation (H4)—relate to the production of novel 
antibiotic therapies in Sector 2.   H5—conservation dampens 
production—evaluates the impact of Sector 3 conservation initiatives on 
the production of new antibiotics.  H6—excessive regulation dampens 
production—evaluates the impact of regulatory changes in Sector 4 on 
the production of new drugs.  H7 does not fit neatly into any particular 
Sector, but has important implications for several areas.  The following 
Part explores each hypothesis in more depth. 
Both economists and lawyers have suggested that expansions in 
patent law might encourage appropriate conservation of antibiotics.59  
Two hypotheses arise from this literature: patent holder waste (H1), and 
a related concept, patent holder conservation (H2).60  Patent holder 
waste (H1) suggests that when companies hold time-limited property 
rights, they lack financial incentives to manage the antibiotic for the 
long-term public health.  Facing patent expiration in a few years, a 
company might zealously market the drug, leading to premature 
resistance.61  The remaining costs of that resistance are externalized 
when the patent expires.62 
 
 59 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 60 The term “waste” is taken from the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5 (1278).  
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 81-86; Outterson et al., Antimicrobial 
Patents, supra note 4, at 563. 
 61 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 20; Fischer, supra note 51; Noonan, supra note 
51; Horowitz & Moehring, supra note 51, at 578-80; Kades, supra note 4, at 635-43; 
Laxminarayan, Scope of Antibiotic Patents, supra note 51; Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, 
supra note 4, at 80. 
 62 This is a simplification in at least two ways.  First, expiration of the patent is not a bright 
line moment for generic entry, as companies generally litigate generic entry and may have 
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Patent holder conservation (H2) is a related claim, suggesting that 
if patent holders were given longer and broader patent rights, they could 
manage resistance more efficiently.  The classic analogy is the 
enclosure of the commons from Hardin’s seminal article in Science.63  
Although they are related claims, patent holder waste (H1) and patent 
holder conservation (H2) should be distinguished because the empirical 
data for each proposition may diverge.  For example, H1 predicts that 
patent owners will aggressively market antibiotics during the last few 
years of patent life.  H2 makes a different claim—that if granted longer 
patents, the companies would manage antibiotic use for the long term.  
These propositions are logically distinct.  If companies always sell to 
the extent the market will bear, then H1 may be true while H2 will be 
false.  Put another way, H1 describes a potential problem while H2 is a 
possible solution. 
A simplified example illustrates the difficulties with patent holder 
conservation.  Assume that a patented antibiotic yields $100 million in 
sales per year, with ten years left in the patent term.  With a discount 
(inflation) rate of five percent, the net present value of the expected 
income stream is approximately $772 million.64  If additional marketing 
could add ten percent per year to net revenues, the company’s net 
present value jumps by $413 million to $1.185 billion.65  In this 
simplified example, conservation will not generate positive economic 
results for the company unless incremental resistance would have 
destroyed about thirty-five percent of the net present value sales during 
the patent period.66  These calculations are very sensitive to the major 
assumptions: the discount (inflation) rate,67 the increase in sales that 
could be achieved with unchecked marketing, and the response rate of 
resistance.  Therefore, patent holder conservation depends upon both the 
effectiveness of advertising to change discretionary sales, as well as the 
effect of those marginal sales upon resistance during the patent period.  
These hypotheses are theoretical predictions that should be 
empirically tested.  For example, real-world changes in drug firm 
marketing behavior near the end of the patent term raise difficult 
questions for H1.  Patent-based drug companies generally reduce their 
 
multiple patents on a product or use.  Second, branded sales do not automatically cease upon 
patent expiration.  In both cases, the patent holder waste hypothesis is weakened in that the 
assumption of a time-limited property right is empirically disproven, or at least made significantly 
more complex. 
 63 Hardin, supra note 5, at 1243-48. 
 64 Net present value calculation made at Investopedia New Present Value Calculator, 
http://www.investopedia.com/calculator/NetPresentValue.aspx?viewed=1 (assuming $100 
million in revenues each year for ten years with a five percent discount rate). 
 65 Id. (assuming a five percent discount rate and a ten percent increase in sales each year, i.e., 
$100 million in year 1, $110 million in year 2, $121 million in year 3, etc.). 
 66 $413 is 34.9% of $1185. 
 67 Higher discount rates make antibiotic conservation less attractive to companies. 
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marketing expenses several years in advance of patent expiration, 
perhaps due to the time lag between marketing investments and 
resulting drug sales.68  To avoid creating positive externalities for 
generic rivals, the patent-based drug companies generally reduce 
marketing in the last few years of the patent.69  This is exactly the 
opposite of the behavior predicted by patent holder waste (H1).  
Furthermore, after patent expiry, neither generic companies nor the 
former patent holder engage in much marketing,70 suggesting that losing 
patent protection might actually reduce waste through less intensive 
marketing.  Lichtenberg and Duflos find prescription drug utilization to 
be relatively flat after patent expiration, despite the entry of much 
cheaper generics.  They hypothesize that the price effect and marketing 
effect roughly cancel one another out.71  If this result holds true for 
antibiotics, then both the patent-holder waste (H1) and patent-holder 
conservation (H2) hypotheses suffer a direct empirical challenge. 
The third hypothesis (patent incentives are inadequate for 
antibiotic production) is rooted in the relatively short treatment course72 
and low reimbursement rates for most antibiotics.73  It is said that 
antibiotic markets remain inappropriately small compared to their health 
benefits.74  This is another way of saying that the patent owner captures 
an inadequate percentage of the social welfare surplus created by the 
antibiotic.   Absent attractive markets, companies will not invest 
appropriately in antibiotic R&D.  Many methods could be employed to 
augment revenues during the patent term, including tax incentives 
 
 68 FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & GAUTIER DUFLOS, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL 
RESEARCH, TIME RELEASE: THE EFFECT OF PATENT EXPIRATION ON U.S. DRUG PRICES, 
MARKETING, AND UTILIZATION BY THE PUBLIC (2009), http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/mpr_11.htm. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. (“The two hypothesized effects of increased competition from generics—increased 
utilization due to falling prices, and decreased utilization due to reduced marketing—appear 
approximately to offset each other. . . .  [T]he number of free samples declined sharply after 
patent expiration . . . .”).  Their data was virtually all prescription drugs sold in the United States 
during 2000-2004, not just antibiotics. 
 72 J.H. Powers, Antimicrobial Drug Development—The Past, the Present, and the Future, 10 
CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 23, 26 (2004) (“Finally, many antimicrobials are 
prescribed for treatment durations ranging from a single dose to 10 days of treatment.  This short-
term use limits the potential profitability of antibacterial drugs compared to other classes of 
drugs.”); Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 8.  While this maxim is oft-repeated, there is no 
inherent reason why reimbursement must be tied to length of treatment.  Several recent biological 
drugs, especially in oncology, have prices in excess of $20,000 despite a short course of 
treatment.  See, e.g., Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much Is Life Worth: Cetuximab, Non-
Small Cell Lung Cancer, and the $440 Billion Question, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1044 
(2009).  The problem is actually the reimbursement model, not the length of treatment.  
 73 See infra Part III.C. 
 74 Steven J. Projan, Why Is Big Pharma Getting Out of Antibacterial Drug Discovery?,  
6 CURRENT OPINION IN MICROBIOLOGY 427, 427-28 (2003); Wenzel, supra note 2. 
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(Sector 4) and improved reimbursement (Sector 5), but longer patent 
terms are most frequently proposed as an additional incentive for 
antibiotic production.  This view has many champions, including a well-
known drug company representative;75 the Infectious Diseases Society 
of America;76 an intergovernmental conference in Europe;77 and other 
leading infectious disease experts.78  Others advance this claim in 
narrower circumstances.  Ben Roin has argued that pharmaceutical 
patent incentives are particularly weak for obvious uses of existing 
drugs.79  Roin calls for new periods of data exclusivity rather than 
longer patents.80 
Fourth, resistance makes existing antibiotic drugs obsolete over 
time, creating market opportunities for new drugs.81  To the extent that 
competition with existing drugs discourages market entry by a new 
drug,82 resistance clears the field and facilitates introduction of new 
drugs.  This is the resistance stimulates innovation hypothesis (H4).  
Resistance also encourages the production of antibiotics with novel 
features.  Examples include new drug classes that bypass existing 
resistance mechanisms, such as ketolides,83 glycylcyclines,84 and some 
 
 75 Projan, supra note 74, at 429-30. 
 76 BAD BUGS, supra note 10; Brad Spellberg et al., Trends in Antimicrobial Drug 
Development: Implications for the Future, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279 (2004); 
Talbot et al., supra note 40. 
 77 Roger Finch & Pamela A. Hunter, Antibiotic Resistance—Action to Promote New 
Technologies: Report of an EU Intergovernmental Conference Held in Birmingham, U.K., 12-13 
December 2005, 58 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY (SUPP. S1) i3 (2006). 
 78 S. Ragnar Norrby, Carl Erik Nord & Roger Finch, Lack of Development of New 
Antimicrobial Drugs: A Potential Serious Threat to Public Health, 5 LANCET INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 115 (2005); Wenzel, supra note 2; Barry Eisenstein, Editorial, Antibiotic Research: 
The Kryptonite of Superbugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2009, at 9 (calling for longer antibiotic 
patent periods; Eisenstein is the Senior Vice President of Scientific Affairs at Cubist 
Pharmaceuticals). 
 79 Data exclusivity hinders FDA approval by generic companies, and hence delays market 
entry.  The general effect is somewhat similar to patents, but the legal mechanism is different.  
See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
503, 567 (2009). 
 80 Id.  But see Kevin Outterson, Death from the Public Domain?, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 45 
(2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/volume-87/roin/death-from-the-public-domain.html 
(critiquing Roin’s positions). 
 81 See infra Part III.A. 
 82 Powers, supra note 72, at 25-26 (“There are several reasons why antibacterials may be at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to other drugs.  There is a high level of competition with drugs 
already on the market.  As shown above, there are a number of agents within various classes still 
available.  While resistance is an emerging problem in a relative sense, the majority of infectious 
diseases in terms of absolute numbers in the USA are still caused by susceptible pathogens.”). 
 83 C.E. Nord, D.J. Farrell & R. Leclercq, Impact of Ketolides on Resistance Selection and 
Ecological Effects During Treatment for Respiratory Tract Infections, 10 MICROBIAL DRUG 
RESISTANCE 255, 257 (2004) (“Overall, these findings suggest that ketolides may have a lower 
potential to select for resistance than existing MLS antibacterials, a factor that will be 
advantageous in terms of preserving their long-term utility.”); see also Grit Ackermann & Arne 
C. Rodloff, Drugs of the 21st Century: Telithromycin (HMR 3647)—The First Ketolide, 51 J. 
ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 497, 506 (2003) (“[T]elithromycin did not lead to Clostridium 
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other antibiotics.85  This second innovation effect is not limited to drugs, 
but includes innovation in complementary products such as diagnostic 
tests and conservation techniques. 
Fifth, effective conservation measures will dampen the demand for 
antibiotics and therefore reduce the incentive to develop new ones.86  
Efforts to reduce unnecessary use of antibiotics necessarily impair the 
market for these products, reducing unit sales.87   This is the 
conservation dampens production hypothesis (H5).  But it is not clear 
whether H5 is a bad thing if the goal is healthy people rather than just 
more drugs.  Conservation prevents infections, which is even better than 
successfully treating them. 
Sixth, according to some drug companies, the FDA imposes 
unreasonable regulatory burdens prior to marketing approval that are 
particularly difficult to overcome for antibiotics.88  These regulations 
are said to increase the expense of clinical trials, delay market entry, and 
generally discourage antibiotic production.  This is the excessive 
regulation dampens production hypothesis (H6): 
The main reason why industry has left the field of antibiotic research 
and development is the poor return on investment owing to 
increasing costs of drug development, caused, in part, by increasing 
demands from regulatory authorities, and stricter pricing controls 
imposed by many governments.89 
 
difficile colonization.”). 
 84 Gary E. Stein & William A. Craig, Tigecycline: A Critical Analysis, 43 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 518, 518 (2006) (“[Tigecycline] overcome[s] the 2 major mechanisms of 
tetracycline resistance: tetracycline-specific efflux pump acquisition and ribosomal protection.”). 
 85 David L. Paterson, Clinical Experience with Recently Approved Antibiotics, 6 CURRENT 
OPINION PHARMACOLOGY 486 (2006) (“Pharmaceutical companies recognized the threat of 
increasing antibiotic resistance in organisms such as enterococci and staphylococci.  Several new 
compounds were developed with activity against vancomycin-resistant enterococci and 
vancomycin-resistance S. aureus.”). 
 86 Kades, supra note 4, at 656; Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 100, 
119; Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A Call to Action for 
the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 158 (2008). 
 87 Norrby, supra note 78, at 117 (“Another problem for pharmaceutical companies is that the 
indications for which antibiotics are prescribed most commonly are now being questioned.  The 
best examples are acute bronchitis, acute exacerbations of acute bronchitis, acute sinusitis, and 
acute otitis media, indications for which drastically reduced use is now advocated.”); Powers, 
supra note 72, at 26 (“[C]linicians see the appropriate public health need to preserve older 
antimicrobial agents through judicious use, that is, not prescribing antibacterials to patients who 
do not have a bacterial infection. . . . Experts often also recommend reserving new agents for 
patients who may have disease caused by resistant pathogens, limiting the potential use of a new 
drug.”). 
 88 See, e.g., Projan, supra note 74, at 429. 
 89 Norrby, supra note 78, at 116-19 (suggesting relaxation of regulatory requirements in 
antibiotic clinical testing).  But see Powers, supra note 72 at 26 (“However, there are no increased 
regulatory hurdles for antimicrobials, or specifically antibacterials, compared with other 
therapeutic classes.”). 
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Finally, much of the legal and economic literature describes 
externalities from antibiotic use as predominantly negative (H7).  The 
classic example is inappropriate use of an antibiotic by a patient with a 
viral upper respiratory infection, which threatens the public with 
resistant infections.90  In this archetype, the doctor and patient both have 
inappropriate reasons to use the antibiotic despite the lack of medical 
need (antibiotics are ineffective against viruses).  Society bears the costs 
of both resistance and inappropriate drug expenditures. 
The medical literature describes these relationships with more 
complexity and subtlety.91  In addition to negative externalities, the 
patient may be harmed directly (an internalized cost).  Receiving 
antibiotics may expose the patient to significant personal risk.  One 
mechanism is Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD), which is 
a severe and sometimes life-threatening diarrheal disease triggered by 
antibiotic use (i.e., a nosocomial disease).92  A second personal cost is 
promoting resistance in commensal bacteria in the patient’s body.93  
Prior antibiotic use is a risk factor for infection by drug-resistant 
bacteria such as MRSA, increasing the relative risk by a factor of 2.1.94  
When certain antibiotics are used, the relative risk of MRSA is almost 
three times greater.95  Similar results have been found for resistant 
pneumococci after the use of oral cephalosporins and penicillins, with 
each drug resulting in quite different patterns of resistance and 
susceptibility.96  Twenty-five percent of patients receiving fourteen-day 
treatments of ciprofloxacin developed resistance to nalidixic acid or 
ciprofloxacin that was not detected before therapy began.97  One third of 
 
 90 See, e.g., Kades, supra note 4, at 626-27. 
 91 See, e.g., Marc Lipsitch & Matthew H. Samore, Antimicrobial Use and Antimicrobial 
Resistance: A Population Perspective, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 347 (2002); see also 
Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 4-5 (collecting sources); Outterson, Vanishing Public 
Domain, supra note 4, at 104-09. 
 92 R.C. Owens, Jr. et al., Antimicrobial-Associated Risk Factors for Clostridium difficile 
Infections, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S19 (2008); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 93 Bruno Fantin et al., Ciprofloxacin Dosage and Emergence of Resistance in Human 
Commensal Bacteria, 200 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 390 (2009) (finding that ciprofloxacin use 
may select for resistance in commensal non-pathogenic bacteria). 
 94 Evelina Tacconelli et al., Does Antibiotic Exposure Increase the Risk of Methicillin-
Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Isolation? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 61 
J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 26, 32 (2008).  “This meta-analysis shows a clear 
association between exposure to antibiotics and MRSA isolation.”  Id. at 26. 
 95 Id. at 33 (“This risk is almost three times greater after the use of quinolones and 
glycopeptides.”). 
 96 Matthew H. Samore et al., Mechanisms by Which Antibiotics Promote Dissemination of 
Resistant Pneumococci in Human Populations, 163 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 160, 166 (2006) (“The 
results of this study support the hypothesis that distinct antimicrobial classes promote 
pneumococcal resistance by different mechanisms.”). 
 97 Fantin et al., supra note 93, at 395. 
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these patients developed resistance to levofloxacin during ciprofloxacin 
therapy.98  Antibiotics can directly harm some patients. 
Information deficits also play a role.  Even if the patient is directly 
harmed, the negative effect is not truly “internalized” if patients and 
physicians are not aware of the existence and magnitude of the damage.  
This situation is akin to a factory that is not aware that it is polluting or 
that the pollution is damaging its own property.  Even with low 
transaction costs, optimal solutions require accurate knowledge. 
In addition, some resistance externalities may be positive.  Search 
and destroy infection control techniques in hospitals and long-term care 
facilities can reduce the spread of MRSA in a facility, but they also 
create positive externalities for competing facilities in the community 
when the patient is discharged.99  Discharging only non-carriers makes 
infection control easier and cheaper for competitors within the same 
epidemiological “germ-shed.”100 
Finally, some antibiotics and patients display heterogeneous 
externality profiles.  Some company-sponsored studies suggest that 
ketolides may inflict less ecological damage than some other 
antibiotics.101  Some antibiotics are associated with higher risks of 
MRSA.102  For some important infections (tuberculosis, HIV, influenza 
and Group A streptococci), treatment itself is a major tool for 
preventing transmission of susceptible strains.  Negative resistance 
externalities might also be weighed differently if the patient is an 
African child with a high fever in a low-resource setting.  All of these 
factors add to the complexity of the analysis.  Any attempt to optimize 
antibiotic conservation and production incentives should understand the 
ecosystem prior to intervention.  The next Part explores these contextual 
elements. 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Put another way, transferring MRSA carriers to nursing homes or community hospitals, or 
discharging them to the community, imposes uncompensated external costs on competitors. 
 100 A “germ-shed” is roughly analogous to a watershed: regions that are epidemiologically 
interdependent and thus share positive and negative infectious disease externalities.  Kevin 
Outterson, Germ-Sheds (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Sage & Hyman, supra 
note 3, at 34.  
 101 Nord et al., supra note 83, at 255 (“Thus, it is prudent to evaluate the likely ecologic 
impact of new antibacterial agents—and their potential to select for resistance—before they are 
widely introduced into clinical practice.”); id. at 257 (“Overall, these findings suggest that 
ketolides may have a lower potential to select for resistance than existing MLS antibacterials, a 
factor that will be advantageous in terms of preserving their long-term utility.”); see also 
Ackermann & Rodloff, supra note 83, at 506 (“[T]elithromycin did not lead to Clostridium 
difficile colonization.”). 
 102 Tacconelli et al., supra note 94, at 33 (“This risk is almost three times greater after the use 
of quinolones and glycopeptides.”). 
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III.     THE ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE AND INNOVATION 
 
Legal and economic models tend to oversimplify the biology of 
antibiotic resistance.  The relationships are heterogeneous and complex, 
as are most ecological systems.103  As Marc Lipsitch notes: “[T]he scale 
of the problem, and the rate at which resistance becomes a problem, is 
highly variable, depending on the antimicrobial agent, the pathogen and 
the setting in which transmission occurs.”104  For example, while 
resistance to penicillin is widespread for some bacterial species,105 
group A streptococci remain fully susceptible to penicillin after many 
decades of intensive use.106  For other drugs and species, limited 
resistance emerged almost immediately.107 
Resistance is not limited by the boundaries of a single patent 
application.  Resistance frequently occurs across different drugs within 
a class,108 and a few forms of resistance (some efflux systems and 
permeability changes) apply across multiple classes.  In a recent clinical 
trial, treatment of healthy volunteers with a fourteen-day regime of 
ciprofloxacin triggered resistance to other members of the quinolone 
and fluoroquinolone class, including nalidixic acid and levofloxacin.109  
Resistance can also be transmitted across bacterial species.110  
Resistance within classes and between classes differs by both pathogen 
 
 103 Lipsitch, supra note 1. 
 104 Id. at 438. 
 105 CDC’s Role in Monitoring and Preventing Antimicrobial Resistance: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. 2 (June 24, 2008) (statement 
of Fred C. Tenover, Dir., Office of Antimicrobial Resistance, Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention) [hereinafter CDC’s Role Hearing] (“To provide a sense of the problem, unpublished 
data from CDC’s National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance System indicate that [more than 
ninety percent] of strains of Staphylococcus aureus, a bacterial species that causes a spectrum of 
illnesses from minor skin infections to serious life-threatening diseases, are no longer treatable 
with penicillin, while one third of Streptococcus pneumoniae isolates, a common cause of ear 
infections, pneumonia, and meningitis, are also no longer treatable with penicillin.”). 
 106 Symposium, Why Have Group A Streptococci Remained Susceptible to Penicillin?, 26 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1341 (1998). 
 107 See, e.g., Ellie Hershberger et al., Quinupristin-Dalfopristin Resistance in Gram-Positive 
Bacteria: Mechanism of Resistance and Epidemiology, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92 
(2004) (finding that resistance emerged not long after regulatory approval). 
 108 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 94-99 (collecting sources). 
 109 Fantin et al., supra note 93, at 395; see also David C. Hooper, Emerging Mechanisms of 
Fluoroquinolone Resistance, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 337 (2001) (describing the 
mechanisms of fluoroquinolone resistance, including the role of transmission and selection in 
reservoir populations). 
 110 Cesar A. Arias & Barbara E. Murray, Antibiotic-Resistant Bugs in the 21st Century—A 
Clinical Super-Challenge, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 439, 443 (2009) (“Moreover, the common 
presence of these β-lactamase genes of gram-negative bacteria in transferable mobile elements 
means that these genes could reach virtually any gram-negative bacterium and become a major 
threat in the future.”). 
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and drug,111 so the relationships are complex and subject to revision as 
the biology becomes better known. 
Many of the models for resistance mistakenly assume that 
resistance occurs primarily through single point mutations, based on the 
example of tuberculosis.  If the avoidance of single point mutations is 
the goal, then policy makers will insist on preventing suboptimal dosing 
or premature suspension of antibiotic therapy.  For this reason, patients 
are often told to complete the full course of antibiotics.  But single point 
mutation is rare in some drug-bug combinations, meaning that this 
advice may be counterproductive in some cases.  Resistance to some 
drugs is acquired only through complex exchanges of genetic material, 
and the novel strains thereby created may gain an advantage in 
transmitting to other hosts for many reasons other than treatment of the 
infection of interest with the drug of interest.112  Such mechanisms of 
indirect selection for resistant strains may include treatment of patients 
who do not suffer from the organism of interest but who harbor it on 
their bodies, or treatment with other antibiotics (besides the one of 
interest) to which the same strains happen to be resistant.113  For these 
patients, a completely different strategy might be appropriate, including 
early cessation of antibiotic therapy.114 
Several examples from Lipsitch and Samore illustrate other 
potential models for acquisition of a resistant infection, focusing on a 
population perspective rather than simply a single patient.  First, if a 
hospital ward is already colonized with resistant bacteria, treating a 
patient with an antibiotic as a surgical prophylactic (preventative 
treatment) might clear an ecological niche for the rapid growth of 
resistant infections like MRSA in the patient.115  Second, patients may 
enter the hospital colonized with both susceptible and resistant species; 
treatment with an antibiotic clears the susceptible species and may 
 
 111 See, e.g., Richard J. Ryan, Chris Lindsell & Paul Sheehan, Fluoroquinolone Resistance 
During 2000-2005: An Observational Study, 8 BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES 71 (2008) 
(associating empiric use of moxifloxacin, a fluoroquinolone marketed as Avelox®, with increased 
resistance by Gram negative bacteria; use of other tested fluoroquinolones (ciprofloxacin, 
levofloxacin, and gatifloxacin) was associated with a decrease in resistance by Gram negative 
organisms). 
 112 Lipsitch & Samore, supra note 91 (describing four models of antimicrobial resistance). 
 113 Hooper, supra note 109, at 339 (“Thus, for all three organisms in which fluoroquinolone 
resistance has become problematic despite a requirement for multiple mutations, other 
epidemiologic factors (of transmission and ongoing selection in reservoir populations of 
organisms) appear to be at work.”). 
 114 A study is underway in the Netherlands to test prospectively whether a common fourteen-
day antibiotic course of treatment can be shortened to seven days.  Cees van Nieuwkoop et al., 
Treatment Duration of Febrile Urinary Tract Infection (FUTIRST trial): A Randomized Placebo-
Controlled Multicenter Trial Comparing Short (7 Days) Antibiotic Treatment with Conventional 
Treatment (14 Days), 9 BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES 131 (2009). 
 115 Lipsitch & Samore, supra note 91, at 349 (describing four models of antimicrobial 
resistance). 
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induce growth in the resistant bacteria.116  Finally, if the bacterial 
population within an individual includes a mixture of resistant and 
susceptible bacteria, as is often the case, treatment will increase the 
burden of resistant bacteria in the treated person and the risk of 
transmission of these bacteria, increasing the chance of infection with 
resistant species, even to people who were never treated.117  The 
common theme of these mechanisms is that none of them requires the 
new appearance of a resistant strain within a treated individual, but 
rather all rely on the indirect effects of treatment, frequently creating 
negative externalities.  Legal and economic studies of antibiotic 
resistance should not ignore these indirect treatment effect externalities. 
Simplistic models of resistance miss too much biological 
complexity.  We should expect no less heterogeneity and complexity 
when we introduce legal variables.  The conclusions we draw about 
appropriate policy responses to resistance may need to be carefully 
tailored to the complex ecology of drug-bug interactions.  Legal and 
economic models have an uncanny penchant for simplifying 
assumptions, but the relationship between resistance and innovation 
should not be among them.  Normal legal arguments supporting 
innovation and new drug production may not apply to antibiotics, and 
antibiotic conservation may yield unique social welfare gains that might 
not otherwise be expected. 
The following three sub-Parts explore these contextual issues in 
depth: (A) innovation in the face of resistance; (B) balancing 
conservation and production; and (C) the role of insurance 
reimbursement. 
 
A.     Resistance May Promote Innovation 
 
The conventional wisdom is that resistance undermines antibiotic 
innovation.  Fear of resistance may discourage companies from 
introducing new antibiotics into the market.118  This Part directly 
challenges this proposition.  Resistance may plausibly affect innovation 
through three mechanisms: (1) clearing out competitor drugs; (2) 
affecting sales during the patent period; and (3) steering innovation 
towards novel classes. 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Projan, supra note 74, at 428. 
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1.     Resistance Facilitates Competitive Entry 
 
Resistance facilitates market entry by destroying competing drugs 
and thereby creating new markets for antibiotic drugs.119  The U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) approves drugs based upon their safety 
and effectiveness.   For most drugs, effectiveness is a static 
determination.120  Approved drugs can lose relative effectiveness over 
time as better drugs enter the market, but this is simply the natural effect 
of competition and innovation.  Antibiotics are not immune to this 
competitive dynamic, but they suffer an additional market threat as 
resistance erodes the absolute effectiveness of the drug.  Resistance 
destroys existing antibiotics by rendering them absolutely less effective 
over time.  Penicillin and methicillin were excellent antibiotics and 
would have retained greater market share but for resistance, which 
paved the way for subsequent less desirable blockbuster drugs like 
ciprofloxacin, erythromycin, levofloxacin, and vancomycin.  These 
follow-on drugs would have faced more difficult competition absent 
resistance, which diminished both the relative and, more importantly, 
the absolute effectiveness of penicillin and methicillin. 
 
2.     Resistance Does Not Appear to Significantly Harm Sales During 
the Patent Term 
 
Patent-based drug companies face a disincentive only if resistance 
appears at commercially significant levels during the patent term.  
Begin with the assumption that that economically significant resistance 
occurs no earlier than patent expiration.121  If so, then resistance does 
not undermine patent-based incentives for innovation.  This is an 
 
 119 An early version of this was offered by David Shlaes in 2003: “Resistance creates markets; 
use creates resistance.”  David M. Shlaes, The Abandonment of Antibacterials: Why and 
Wherefore?, 3 CURRENT OPINION IN PHARMACOLOGY 470, 471 fig.1 (2003); see also 
Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 7 (noting that firms are targeting the MRSA market); 
THE GLOBAL ANTIBACTERIALS MARKET: R&D PIPELINES, MARKET ANALYSIS AND 
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPES (Arrowhead Publishers, 2007) (“The global anti-infective market is 
currently valued at US$66.5 billion with antibacterial agents accounting for over [fifty percent] of 
sales.  The antibacterial market is set to grow to over US$45.0 billion by 2012, driven by the 
uptake of newer antibacterial agents . . .”). 
 120 The FDA evaluates safety and efficacy, not comparative effectiveness.  The U.S. Congress 
recently funded some comparative effectiveness research but did not change the FDA approval 
process.  Paige Goodwin & Kevin Outterson, Editorial, From Comparative Effectiveness to Cost 
Effectiveness?, 14 PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT 126 (2009). 
 121 To be precise, I mean the earlier of patent expiration per the FDA Orange Book or the date 
of first generic entry in the United States.  This date sets the baseline period of marketing 
exclusivity that the company should reasonably expect from U.S. patent law. 
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important point: When economically significant resistance is delayed 
until after patent expiry, the drug company receives the full economic 
benefit of the patent period.122  The company may also benefit from 
resistance that reduces competition from prior drugs.  A myriad of other 
factors might interrupt the commercial plans of the drug company, but 
premature resistance would not be among them.123  This assumption, if 
true, would mean that the relationship between resistance and 
innovation held a positive sign: Increased resistance would increase 
innovation.124 
As noted above, this second point rests on the assumption that 
economically significant resistance does not occur during the patent 
term.  This assumption can be empirically tested.  One method would be 
to compare sales data for leading antibiotics with their patent expiration 
dates.  A recent study identified the top ten hospital antibiotics, by days 
of therapy per 1,000 patient-days.125  The following analysis looks at 
these ten hospital antibiotics.  Proprietary sales data from IMS Health 
establish that all of these leading antibiotics were still generating 
significant sales after generic entry.126  Four of these drugs (cefazolin, 
metronidazole, vancomycin, and clindamycin) have been off patent for 
at least a decade, and yet still sell in sufficient volume to make the top 
ten list.  For vancomycin and metronidazole, sales actually accelerated 
after patent expiration, as will be discussed in Part IV infra.  Only 
levofloxacin remained on patent in early 2009, with expiration due in 
2010; gatifloxacin was removed from the U.S. market in 2006 for safety 
concerns, but sold well up to that point.  The four remaining antibiotics 
on the list have recently experienced patent expiration, which permits us 
 
 122 The question of ex post experiences and ex ante projections of resistance will be discussed 
shortly. 
 123 For a discussion of these other factors, see Projan, supra note 74; S.J. Projan & D.M. 
Shlaes, Antibacterial Drug Discovery: Is It All Downhill from Here?, 10 CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION (SUPP. 4) 18 (2004). 
 124 In this simple model, resistance reduces the existing stock of generic competitors and does 
not harm the innovator molecule until after patent expiration.  Both signs are positive for the 
production of innovative new antibiotics. 
 125 Conan MacDougall & Ronald E. Polk, Variability in Rates of Use of Antibacterials Among 
130 US Hospitals and Risk-Adjustment Models for Interhospital Comparison, 29 INFECTION 
CONTROL & HOSPITAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 203, 206 (2008).  The top ten hospital antibiotics in these 
U.S. hospitals, from August 2002 to July 2003, in descending order, were: levofloxacin, 
cefazolin, ceftriaxone, metronidazole, vancomycin, piperacillin-tazobactam, gatifloxacin, 
azithromycin, ciprofloxacin and clindamycin.  For a similar list, also see Amy L. Pakyz, Conan 
MacDougall, Michael Oinonen & Ronald E. Polk, Trends in Antibacterial Use in US Academic 
Health Centers: 2002 to 2006, 168 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2254, 2258 (2008). 
 126 I chose sales as the relevant metric rather than published reports of resistance, primarily 
because the task is to measure the effect of resistance on R&D incentives.  Published reports of 
resistance to a specific pathogen may affect sales, but other factors (including marketing and 
medical need) may nonetheless intervene to drive overall sales.  Measuring sales directly seems 
the most accurate method. 
OUTTERSON.31-3 1/28/2010  6:09:35 PM 
2010]      LEGAL ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE  639 
to observe U.S. sales in the five years prior to generic entry.  Chart 1 
presents this data. 
 
Chart 1.  U.S. Sales (in Millions of Constant Year -5 Dollars) in the 
Five Years Prior to Generic Entry127 
 
 
 
Resistance does not appear to have significantly undercut sales for 
the patent holders at the end of the terms,128 although we do not know 
the counterfactual (i.e., what sales would have been absent any 
resistance).  We are also unable to measure the effect of reduced 
marketing in the last years of patent life.  Nevertheless, it would be 
difficult to conclude that resistance was economically significant during 
the patent term for these drugs.129  
The data on Zithromax® (azithromycin) and Cipro® 
(ciprofloxacin) deserve special mention.  One might be tempted to see 
evidence of H1 patent holder waste in the last full year of the core 
 
 127 Proprietary data from IMS Health Inc. MIDAS™ database, 1997-2007 (Antibiotics ATC 
Level 4, J1C1, MNF YTD Oct. 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter IMS Data].  This data 
includes all branded forms of Recephin® (ceftriaxone), Zosyn® (piperacillin-tazobactam), 
Zithromax® (azithromycin), and Cipro® (ciprofloxacin).  Since the data covers different years 
for each antibiotic, a uniform annual deflator of 2.9% was applied; this was the average 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for 2002-2006. 
 128 These conclusions are tentative, for antibiotic sales also fluctuate with cycles of infectious 
disease and other exogenous factors unrelated to resistance.  I have not adjusted the data for the 
overall level of infections in a given year. 
 129 The simplified example suggested that relatively high levels of commercially significant 
resistance would be required in order to make conservation economically desirable for the patent 
holder.  See supra notes 64-67.  The data sample in this Part may have a significant selection bias, 
as it is comprised of only the most successful antibiotics, which will not include antibiotics 
decimated by resistance.  A possible response is that some antibiotics are more vulnerable to 
resistance than others, and since the goal is population health, we should focus on the antibiotics 
most used in the population.  These issues deserve more attention. 
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Zithromax® patent,130 but, despite significant levels of resistance,131 
unit sales of azithromycin remained strong in 2009.  Pfizer may have 
aggressively marketed Zithromax® (the evidence is not clear), but it is 
harder to prove that waste resulted. 
The spike in Cipro® (ciprofloxacin) sales in Year-2 includes sales 
generated by the anthrax scare in the United States following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent mailing of 
several packages containing anthrax spores in October 2001.  The 
decline in the following year may reflect regression to the mean.  In any 
case, the decline in 2002 has little to do with resistance, as ciprofloxacin 
retains significant sales in the United States even today.132 
A second way to approach this question would be to identify the 
date when an antibiotic encountered resistance sufficient to decimate 
sales, and then compare that date with patent expiry.  Such examples are 
difficult to identify.  Very high levels of resistance may be necessary 
before sales are damaged.  Azithromycin resistance levels in the United 
States have declined slightly from 31% in 2000 to 28.9% 2004,133 and 
yet U.S. sales remain robust and growing, with the sales of the branded 
product Zithromax® nearly doubling during the period.134  Indeed, 
Zithromax® was the best selling antibiotic on Chart 1, despite high 
resistance levels in the years immediately prior to generic entry.  High 
levels of resistance during the patent term do not necessarily undercut 
the patent holder’s return on investment. 
An important example of robust sales despite resistance is broad-
spectrum oral penicillin, the poster child for resistance.  Penicillin 
enjoyed annualized U.S. sales exceeding $1.38 billion in 2004, 
confirming that sales remain strong many decades after introduction, 
despite the presence of penicillin-resistant bacteria.135  In June 2008, the 
Director of the CDC Office of Antimicrobial Resistance testified before 
Congress that certain tested strains of Staphylococcus aureas were 
“[ninety percent] resistant to penicillin.”136  Apparently, ninety percent 
resistance to Staphylococcus aureus does not foreclose a major 
commercial U.S. antibiotic market.  Resistance levels differ widely 
across different bug-drug combinations.  Physicians are prescribing 
 
 130 The core Zithromax® patent expired in November 2005.  Pfizer Inc. Annual Report (Form 
10-K), at 9 (Mar. 1, 2006). 
 131 Stephen G. Jenkins, Steven D. Brown & David J. Farrell, Trends in Antibacterial 
Resistance Among Streptococcus pneumoniae Isolated in the USA: Update from PROTEKT US 
YEARS 1-4, 7 ANNALS CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & ANTIMICROBIALS 1, 4 tbl.2 (2008). 
 132  In addition, the generic entry of ciprofloxacin was highly litigated, which may be a 
complicating factor.  See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 133 Jenkins et al., supra note 131. 
 134 IMS Data, supra note 127. 
 135 IMS Data, supra note 127. 
 136 CDC’s Role Hearing, supra note 105. 
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penicillin for other pathogens, such as group A streptococci.137  In any 
event, penicillin continues to be a blockbuster drug, even at generic 
pricing, despite high resistance levels for some bacteria. 
A final example of sales despite some resistance is levofloxacin, 
the most-used hospital antibiotic and the most recent member of the 
“top 10” list138 to be approaching patent expiration.139  Recent clinical 
articles describe levofloxacin as a highly desirable antibiotic without 
widespread resistance to commercially significant pathogens.140  In 
short, it does not appear that clinically important hospital antibiotics 
have been economically weakened through resistance during their 
patent terms.141 
 
3.     Resistance Drives Companies Toward More Innovative Products 
 
Any fear of resistance during the patent term skews R&D towards 
antibiotic projects that are less likely to suffer early resistance.  In early 
stage testing of new antimicrobial compounds, researchers evaluate 
likely resistance profiles.  Compounds for which resistance could be 
easily achieved are likely to be set aside early in the R&D process.142  
The fear of economically significant resistance may generate social 
welfare gains by directing research towards novel antibiotics with 
stronger resistance profiles rather than me-too extensions of existing 
classes.  Private losses are possible here if research into novel classes is 
uniquely more expensive.  But private gains are also plausible, if novel 
antibiotics are more able to attract venture capital, licensing, and 
eventual clinical sales. 
 
 137 Why Have Group A Streptococci Remained Susceptible to Penicillin?, supra note 106. 
 138 MacDougall & Polk, supra note 125. 
 139 Generic entry for levofloxacin is expected in 2010.  See Johnson & Johnson Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q), at 28-29 (Aug. 4, 2009) (discussing litigation in 2009 to delay approval of 
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) filed by Lupin); Johnson & Johnson Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 20, 2009) (disclosing that levofloxacin patent expires on Dec. 20, 
2010). 
 140 V.R. Anderson & C.M. Perry, Levofloxacin: A Review of Its Use as a High-Dose, Short-
Course Treatment for Bacterial Infection, 68 DRUGS 535 (2008); David Felmingham, Rafael 
Canton & Stephen G. Jenkins, Regional Trends in B-Lactam, Macrolide, Fluoroquinolone and 
Telithromycin Resistance Among Streptococcus pneumoniae Isolates 2001-2004, 55 J. INFECTION 
111, 113 tbl.1 (2007) (finding levofloxacin resistance to be quite low, around one percent in 
2004); Jenkins et al., supra note 133. 
 141 One objection to this analysis is the failure to consider the ex ante expectations of the 
patent owner rather than their ex post experience with resistance.  Ex ante projections are more 
relevant to the investment decisions of patent owners.  The data used in this Article focuses on the 
ex post experience as a proxy for expectations. 
 142 In the author’s experience, many anti-infective biotech companies highlight the resistance 
profiles of their compounds at investor conferences. 
OUTTERSON.31-3 1/28/2010  6:09:35 PM 
642 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:3 
To summarize, resistance may plausibly affect innovation through 
three mechanisms: (1) clearing out competitor drugs; (2) affecting sales 
during the patent period; and (3) steering innovation towards novel 
classes.  The first proposition appears to be well supported and the 
result encourages the production of new drugs, a unique advantage for 
antibiotic innovation.   The second proposition appears to be 
unsupported by the available data, meaning it has little or no effect on 
antibiotic innovation.  The third is supported by anecdotal evidence 
from industry, and may plausibly yield positive private and public 
gains, but the definitive exploration of this issue is not undertaken in 
this Article. 
With these caveats in mind, resistance appears to have an overall 
positive effect on the production of innovative antibiotics.  This result 
erodes the foundation of claims that antibiotics possess unique qualities 
that require additional production incentives, as Sector 2 proponents 
often claim.  Indeed, the opposite conclusion seems appropriate: 
Antibiotics require fewer innovation incentives than other types of 
drugs. 
 
B.     Conservation Reduces Demand for New Antibiotics, but May Yield 
Overall Social Welfare Gains 
 
One response to resistance is antibiotic conservation, careful 
rationing or stewardship of these drugs to prolong clinical effectiveness.  
Many antibiotics are overused in clinically improper settings.  
Encouraging the rational use of antibiotics is a conservation measure.143  
Other Sector 3 conservation measures include public health practices to 
reduce the incidence and spread of infectious disease and infection 
control in the hospital, clinic, and community.144 
Conservation is a sound strategy for reducing resistance, but these 
efforts appear to work at cross-purposes with incentives to produce 
novel antibiotics.  Conservation efforts, if successful, necessarily reduce 
the unit sales of antibiotics, which is the central idea in H5—
conservation dampens production.  Antibiotic stewardship and rational 
use programs can be considered anti-marketing campaigns.  Infection 
control efforts, if successful, reduce the spread of dangerous infections 
and reduce the need for antibiotic treatments. 
Conservation also prolongs the clinical usefulness of existing 
products, which makes competitive entry more difficult.  It seems clear 
 
 143 LEVY, supra note 30.  Rational use also has other benefits: lower costs, fewer significant 
side effects, and fewer interactions with other drugs. 
 144 Saver, supra note 35, at 431 (emphasizing the need to focus on physician demand-side 
issues that drive antibiotic misuse). 
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that Sector 3 (public health conservation) is in tension with Sector 2 
(production of new drugs).  As shown in Part III.A.2 supra, the threat of 
commercially significant resistance emerging during the patent term is 
modest.  The same cannot be said for the commercial threats of national 
conservation programs, which may be funded by governments and 
reduce unit sales significantly.145  Drug companies should not fear the 
effect of resistance on their cash flows, but should be greatly concerned 
about well-funded Sector 3 conservation programs. 
In normal pharmaceutical markets, reducing the flow of innovative 
new products might be considered negative.  In every other disease 
category, society should celebrate the arrival of improved therapies.  In 
antibiotic markets, this might not be true.  If existing antibiotic therapies 
remain effective, we do not yet need new ones.  Remember that the goal 
is continued antibiotic effectiveness, not new drugs per se.  If patients 
receive effective treatment, or better yet, avoid infection in the first 
instance, then the social welfare goals have been met. 
Furthermore, the case for innovation presupposes that new drugs 
are better than old ones.  This assumption is not uniformly true.146  If a 
new drug is no better than the old, then the health gains from innovation 
are zero.  From a societal perspective, the net effect is negative, due to 
the expense of R&D.  If a new drug is not better and entails unknown 
safety risks, then innovation results in an even greater social welfare 
loss.  Since resistance degrades the absolute efficacy of established 
antibiotics over time, it may be easier to show that a new antibiotic is 
medically superior to the then-available alternatives.  Social planners—
 
 145 See, e.g., Elifsu Sabuncu et al., Significant Reduction of Antibiotic Use in the Community 
After a Nationwide Campaign in France, 2002-2007, PLOS MED., June 2, 2009, 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000084 
(studying a French national campaign over six years that resulted in a 26.5% reduction in the 
number of antibiotic prescriptions); Benedikt Huttner & Stephan Harbarth, “Antibiotics Are Not 
Automatic Anymore”—The French National Campaign to Cut Antibiotic Overuse, PLOS MED., 
June 2, 2009,  http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed. 
1000080 (noting that said campaign cost €500 million). 
 146 See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Preemption and the Need to Reform the FDA 
Consultation Process, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 539 (2008); Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and 
the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007) (detailing 
the Vioxx safety recall); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Rise and Fall of Natrecor for Congestive 
Heart Failure: Implications for Drug Policy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1095 (2006) (detailing safety 
issues with a new drug); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining 
Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308 (2007); Ray Moynihan, Iona Heath & David Henry, Selling Sickness: 
The Pharmaceutical Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BRITISH MED. J. 886 (2002) 
(questioning the medical need for some new drugs); Mary K. Olson, The Risk We Bear: The 
Effects of Review Speed and Industry User Fees on New Drug Safety, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 175 
(2008) (finding increased safety problems with new drugs approved in an accelerated timeframe); 
Michael A. Steinman et al., Characteristics and Impact of Drug Detailing for Gabapentin, PLOS 
MED., Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal. 
pmed.0040134 (examining the off label promotion of a drug for indications for which evidence of 
efficacy was lacking). 
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or a federal comparative effectiveness agency147—should prefer new 
therapies that represent substantial clinical improvements, but the FDA 
does not require proof of superior efficacy for antibiotics, just safety 
and noninferiority.148 
But let us assume that a certain new antibiotic is actually a better 
drug than existing therapies.  It still does not follow that we should 
prioritize innovative production at the expense of conservation.  Most 
new antibiotics carry serious side effect risks, including adverse 
reactions, liver toxicity, and other serious risks of organ failure.149  The 
properly framed societal choice is not between vancomycin and 
penicillin with high levels of resistance, but between vancomycin with 
all its dangerous side effects and fully effective penicillin protected by 
conservation.  Penicillin was the better drug, and conservation of that 
better drug would have resulted in a social welfare gain by both 
prolonging the usefulness of penicillin and delaying the necessity of 
using more dangerous antibiotics.  In some European countries, 
clinicians have successfully conserved older antibiotics in order to 
reduce the need to resort to more dangerous drugs such as 
vancomycin.150 
Finally, experts suggest that the low-hanging fruit in antibiotic 
research may have been already discovered.151  If true, investments in 
antibiotic R&D will yield declining marginal returns.  As each new 
antibiotic becomes more expensive, the value of conservation rises, if 
both are properly priced in the market.  In Part III.C.1 infra, I 
demonstrate that they are not.  In energy policy, we see a significant 
relationship between increased energy prices and the demand for 
conservation and renewable energy technologies.  If antibiotic markets 
are a similar exhaustible resource, then from a societal perspective, 
 
 147 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 111-4, 123 Stat. 
115 (allocating funding for comparative effectiveness research); see also Goodwin & Outterson, 
supra note 120. 
 148 Clinical drug trials include a treatment arm and a control arm, generally using a placebo.  
In antibiotic trials, placebos are considered unethical, and therefore the control arm utilizes an 
antibiotic that is the standard of care.  The treatment arm must show noninferiority to the control 
arm.  Brad Spellberg and others at the IDSA suggest that the noninferiority standard should be 
weakened to approximate a placebo-controlled trial conducted in a pre-antibiotic era.  Brad 
Spellberg et al., Antimicrobial Agents for Complicated Skin and Skin-Structure Infections: 
Justification of Noninferiority Margins in the Absence of Placebo-Controlled Trials, 49 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 383 (2009); Dennis L. Stevens, Editorial, Antimicrobial Agents for 
Complicated Skin and Skin-Structure Infections: Noninferiority Margins, Placebo-Controlled 
Trials, and the Complexity of Clinical Trials, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 392 (2009).  
This proposal would make it easier to achieve FDA approval for efficacy. 
 149 For example, vancomycin, a major hospital antibiotic, replaced methicillin for treatment of 
MRSA despite significant limitations including poor tissue penetration and potential liver 
toxicity.   Marin H. Kollef, Limitations of Vancomycin in the Management of Resistant 
Staphylococcal Infections, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S191 (2007). 
 150 Personal communication with Ursula Theuretzbacher (on file with author). 
 151 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 77, and sources cited therein. 
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conservation should be an increasingly important policy element, in 
contrast to new production.  Of course, conservation is never fully 
effective over time, so even the most robust conservation program must 
also be paired with some new production of antibiotics. 
 
C.     Insurance Reimbursement Significantly Influences Resistance and 
Conservation 
 
The third contextual issue is money: Insurance reimbursement for 
antibiotics affects innovation and conservation in dramatic ways.  For 
all the ink spilt on intellectual property issues, relatively little has been 
said about reimbursement for antibiotic conservation.152  This is a major 
weakness of the existing literature, as reimbursement systems may 
prove to be of equal or greater importance to many of the institutions 
and people directing antibiotic use. 
On the question of pharmaceutical innovation, much of the 
literature tinkers with the patent system; but in a world of government 
insurance programs, reimbursement changes can have a much more 
direct and powerful effect on company revenues.153  The patent-based 
drug industry recently announced an $80 billion “contribution” to the 
Obama health care reform efforts, including changes in Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement.154  As Bill Sage and David Hyman put it, 
federal reimbursement “offers the longest lever for altering antibiotic 
usage and infection control patterns.”155  Few patent policy levers are of 
this magnitude and immanence; for a best-selling antibiotic, even a 
substantial extension to the patent term would increase the net present 
value of cash flows by a modest amount.156  By contrast, changes in 
 
 152 Two notable exceptions are LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, especially at ch. 3 and 
ch. 6, and Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 28. 
 153 Prescription Drugs—An Overview of Approaches to Negotiate Drug Prices Used by Other 
Countries and U.S. Private Payers and Federal Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John Dicken, Dir., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07358t.pdf [hereinafter Prescription Drugs]; U.S. 
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD 
COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 
AND INNOVATION (2004), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/drugpricingstudy.pdf 
[hereinafter PRICE CONTROLS] (discussing the large impact that European drug pricing 
reimbursement systems have on drug companies); Drug Importation: Would the Price Be Right? 
Hearing Before the S. Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(statement of Kevin Outterson), [hereinafter Drug Importation] (offering a critique of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce study). 
 154 Laura Meckler & Alicia Mundy, For Drug Makers, Concessions Have a Bright Side, 
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2009, at A4. 
 155 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 28. 
 156 See Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 562 (calculating the net present 
value of patent term extensions for antibiotics). 
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hospital, physician, and prescription drug reimbursement currently 
being discussed in Congress could shift tens of billions of dollars 
immediately.157 
While drug patents are undeniably valuable to the pharmaceutical 
companies, their impact on the other institutional players in the U.S. 
health care sector is limited.  For providers such as hospitals and 
physicians, reimbursement systems such as Medicare, Medicaid, and 
private insurance company reimbursement are much more important.158  
Similarly, patients are little affected by antibiotic drug patents as long as 
they are insured,159 but the structure of the insurance reimbursement 
system directly affects the financial incentives presented to patients 
regarding antibiotic therapy.160  Just as bacteria live in complex 
ecological systems, principals and agents in the U.S. health care sector 
inhabit a space populated with powerful institutions that should not be 
ignored in theoretical models.  In the following Parts, we will examine 
the impact of reimbursement on incentives for drug companies, 
providers (hospitals, physicians), and patients.  My claim is that many 
elements of reimbursement affect antibiotic resistance in complex 
patterns. 
 
1.     Drug Company Reimbursement 
 
The first example of reimbursement complexity is the amount paid 
to drug companies for their products.161  Patent law theorists are 
especially fond of market-based price signals for patented products 
because the market sets the value of the patent.  If a patented product 
does not draw much consumer interest, the patent owner will either 
adjust the price or accept smaller unit sales.  If the product is wildly 
successful, the magnitude of market demand directly affects the patent-
based profits that are collected.  In theory, the market for patented 
products thus rewards products in proportion to consumer demand in 
the market, an important advantage over other methods that may lack a 
market test. 
 
 157 1 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS: HEALTH CARE (2008), available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf.  
 158 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 28. 
 159 On a static basis, patents increase the cost of all health care and thus the social cost of 
insurance, but this effect does not specifically alter antibiotic incentives.  On a dynamic basis, 
theory suggests that health care innovation may raise quality and lower costs, but it is hard to find 
empirical support for this in the expensive, innovative, and mixed quality environment of the U.S. 
health sector. 
 160 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 3 (discussing the role of insurance on antibiotic 
resistance). 
 161 See, e.g., PRICE CONTROLS, supra note 153; Drug Importation, supra note 153; 
Prescription Drugs, supra note 153. 
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But the market does not set pharmaceutical prices in high-income 
countries, including the United States.162  U.S. drug reimbursement 
prices are negotiated through a complex process with significant 
government intervention benefiting specific payors.163  Favored payors 
include Medicaid,164 the Veterans’ Administration (VA),165 and public 
health clinics under § 340b.166  The current Medicare law prohibits the 
government from negotiating drug prices on behalf of private Medicare 
Part D plans.167  A professed goal of the Democratic leadership in 
Congress is to reverse this ban, which might result in near-monopsony 
(oligopsony) purchasing power by Medicare as a purchaser.168 
Even private pharmaceutical reimbursement markets contain an 
interesting mixture of near-monopsony and competition.  Many health 
plans subcontract their prescription drug plans to a small number of 
pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs).  Three PBMs dominate the 
market,169 and one of these large PBMs (Caremark) was recently 
purchased by CVS, a large drug store chain.170  This market structure 
limits price negotiations to a small number of participants. 
Many factors affect the outcome of these negotiations, especially 
efforts to influence agents acting on behalf of the patient.  If a drug is 
generic with many bioequivalent competitors, PBMs can negotiate quite 
low reimbursement rates in a fairly competitive market.  If the drug is 
both important medically and has no good substitutes, the drug 
company wields significant market power in setting prices.  An 
 
 162 See PRICE CONTROLS, supra note 153 (discussing the large impact that European drug 
pricing reimbursement systems have on drug companies); Prescription Drugs, supra note 153. 
 163 Kevin Outterson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, How Medicare Could Get Better Prices on 
Prescription Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFF. w832 (2009) (web exclusive). 
 164 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2006) (outlining mandatory and supplemental Medicaid drug rebate 
programs). 
 165 Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-585, §§ 601, 603, 106 Stat. 4943 (limiting 
prices for prescription drugs purchased by the VA and certain other federal agencies); id. at § 602 
(referencing the 340B program under the Public Health Service Act); 38 U.S.C. § 8126 (2006). 
 166 42 U.S.C. § 256b (2006) (codifying section 340B of the Public Health Service Act); GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: EXPANDING ACCESS TO FEDERAL PRICES 
COULD CAUSE OTHER PRICE CHANGES (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ 
he00118.pdf.  Section 340B also applies to other special categories of favored providers, 
including certain disproportionate share hospitals, urban Indiana health centers, and other 
specified providers serving special populations.  See U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, HRSA—340B Drug Pricing 
Program/Pharmacy Affairs, http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/introduction.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 167 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, sec. 101(a)(2), § 1395w-111, 117 Stat. 2066, 2092-99 (codified as 42 USC § 1395w-
111(i) (2006)); see Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 163. 
 168 Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 163. 
 169 Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Express Scripts, Inc., and CVS Caremark Corporation are 
the largest.  Some large health plans and retail pharmacy chains have PBM capabilities in-house.  
CVS Caremark Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8, 21 (Feb. 27 2008). 
 170 Id. at 3.  The acquisition closed on March 22, 2007.  Id. 
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intermediate case is a drug with possible substitutes,171 especially if the 
PBMs can credibly threaten to refuse to purchase the drug.  This creates 
a potential conflict between the medical needs of the patient and the 
financial goals of the PBM and the insurance company.  One role of 
direct-to-consumer advertising and physician detailing (personal 
marketing by drug companies) is to diminish the latitude of PBMs in 
this situation by driving consumer and physician demand for a 
particular drug.  PBMs react by creating restrictive formularies,172 with 
tiered copays for different types of drugs,173 but they must consider 
consumer and provider preferences when creating and enforcing a 
formulary.174  Drug companies give financial support to some patient 
advocacy groups and deploy the groups to fight formulary restrictions 
and increased copays, frequently without disclosing the conflicts of 
interest.175  Some drug companies have responded to copay increases 
for branded drugs by issuing coupons, which may distort patients’ 
perceived cost of such drugs.176  Drug companies also engage in off-
label marketing, expanding sales into conditions lacking FDA 
approval.177 
More broadly, many commentators are concerned with the 
mismatch between reimbursement and medical need—consumer 
demand builds markets for drugs with modest population health impact, 
while companies fail to mount impressive R&D programs for many 
important diseases.  This problem has three foundations. 
 
 171 Substitutions may come within a drug class, or substitutions from other therapies such as 
surgery. 
 172 A formulary is a list of drugs that a health plan will cover.  Formularies may impose 
restrictions on more expensive drugs, including higher co-payments or multiple tiers of co-
payments.  For example, a formulary might impose a $0 co-pay on generic drugs, a $15 co-pay on 
preferred drugs, and a $50 co-pay on non-preferred drugs. 
 173 Prescription Drugs—Overview of Approaches to Control Prescription Drug Spending in 
Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the 
District of Columbia of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of John E. Dicken, Dir., Health Care, Gov’t Accountability Office), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09819t.pdf. 
 174 Agency costs are present in the PBM relationship as well.  PBMs serve as agents of the 
consumer when negotiating access and prices, but they have their own interests as well, which 
may be in conflict.  National Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Pricing, Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers Policy Background, http://www.reducedrugprices.org/pbm_policy.asp (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010) (detailing potential conflicts of interest regarding PBMs). 
 175 H. Marcy Bortner, Conflicted Advocates: Pharmaceutical Companies’ Funding of Patient 
Advocacy Groups: Report to the West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council (Apr. 
6, 2005) (unpublished report, on file with author); Tinker Ready, Divided Loyalties?: Nonprofit 
Health Advocacy Groups Like to Portray Themselves as Patients’ Allies; Can They Serve 
Corporate Benefactors at the Same Time?, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at F1. 
176 Chana Joffe-Walt, Drug Coupons Hide True Costs from Consumers, NPR, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113969968. 
 177 Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (2008). 
OUTTERSON.31-3 1/28/2010  6:09:35 PM 
2010]      LEGAL ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE  649 
First, global medical need and wealth are not equally distributed or 
correlated.  In fact, the very opposite characterizes our world.178  For 
this reason, pharmaceutical companies develop ever-lengthening lists of 
drugs for the lifestyles of wealthy consumers in high-income countries, 
while devoting relatively little to treating diseases particular to the 
poor.179  This disparity is less salient within high-income countries with 
comprehensive health insurance programs that cover pharmaceuticals. 
The second foundation is the problem of information asymmetries 
regarding pharmaceuticals.  Consumers are not well informed about the 
risks and benefits of prescription drugs, including antibiotics.  Even 
physicians are overwhelmed by the flood of peer-reviewed literature 
and end up relying to some extent on intermediaries such as drug 
marketers.  These informational asymmetries are present for other 
consumer products as well, but the stakes are higher and the process is 
different for drugs.  If we are talking about toasters or coffee shops, 
revealed consumer preferences may be a fine methodology for 
allocating goods and services in the market; we may feel differently for 
antibiotics with the potential for both internal and external harm from 
either using too much or too little, and the potential for a collapse in a 
common pool resource. 
Some view direct-to-consumer (DTC) marketing as a remedy to 
this information gap;180 others consider DTC marketing a corporate tool 
that exploits information asymmetries, creating false demand for cures 
to spurious diseases.181  DTC advertising is not widely used for 
antibiotics in the United States at the present time.182 
Finally, agency costs introduce distortions into consumer 
pharmaceutical markets.183  The patient must rely on a physician to 
decide how and when to prescribe.  In general, agency costs include 
shirking and self-dealing.  Shirking in this context would include a lazy 
 
 178 Pogge, supra note 44. 
 179 Kevin Outterson, Should Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited to 
Specific Diseases?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 279 (2008). 
 180 See Peter J. Pitts, Turning Point or Tipping Point: New FDA Draft Guidances and the 
Future of DTC Advertising, 23 HEALTH AFF. w259 (2004) (web exclusive).  But see Matthew F. 
Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: A Haphazard Approach to Health Promotion, 293 
JAMA 2030 (2005). 
 181 See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE 
US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, 
RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2005); RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, 
SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING 
US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2006); Matthew Perrone, Disease May Not Be Real, but the Drug Profits 
Are, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009, at A4. 
 182 West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council Direct to Consumer Advertising 
Data, CY2008 (on file with author) (reporting no DTC expenditures for any antibiotic). 
 183 Despite concerns about physician agency costs, most observers still appear to prefer that 
antibiotics be sold through physician agency in the form of a prescription as opposed to over-the-
counter. 
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decision to prescribe, without adequately considering all of the potential 
factors in this patient’s case.  Self-dealing would include direct or 
indirect financial rewards that come from prescribing.  Both are present 
in antibiotic markets.184  One legal mechanism to address self-dealing in 
health care is the Stark II law.  The theory behind Stark II is that 
physicians cannot be trusted to refer to an entity if they stand to gain 
financially from the transaction.  Outpatient prescriptions are 
“designated health services” (DHS) under Stark II, and physicians are 
prohibited from making a referral for DHS if they have a financial 
relationship with the entity receiving the referral.  Writing a prescription 
is a referral for Stark II purposes.  Federal law thus effectively prohibits 
prescribing physicians from having financial interests in pharmacies 
located in their office buildings, out of fear that the physicians will be 
tempted to over prescribe in order to capture additional pharmacy 
sales.185  Federal law considers agency costs in prescriptions to be quite 
significant.  Reimbursement systems and the rules policing improper 
utilization should also be designed with agency costs in mind, with the 
knowledge that prescriptions might be influenced by considerations 
other than the patient’s health.186 
The health insurance market is a network of relationships rife with 
potential agency costs.  The health plan sponsor (frequently an 
employer, association, or government entity) is an agent acting on 
behalf of the patient, but it may make cost saving decisions adverse to 
the patient’s health.187  PBMs are themselves agents of the health plans, 
but have been troubled by conflict-of-interest allegations when taking 
secret discounts from drug companies to promote certain drugs.188  Even 
 
 184 Saver, supra note 35, at 431. 
 185 42 U.S.C. §1395nn (2006). 
 186 LAWRENCE P. CASALINO, PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL AND PHYSICIAN-OWNED 
SPECIALTY FACILITIES 18 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Research Synthesis Report No. 15, 
2008) (finding agency cost issues in physician self-referral in specialty facilities and 
recommending changes in reimbursement and legal changes to address the problem); GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE PART B IMAGING SERVICES: RAPID SPENDING GROWTH 
AND SHIFT TO PHYSICIAN OFFICES INDICATE NEED FOR CMS TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08452.pdf 
(discussing agency cost issues in Part B); MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: PHYSICIAN-OWNED SPECIALTY HOSPITALS (2005) (discussing agency 
costs in physician-owned hospitals). 
 187 To a significant degree, the recent history of managed care is the struggle over agency 
costs.  For a summary of the backlash against managed care, see Alain C. Enthoven, Helen H. 
Schauffler & Sara McMenamin, Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 1 (2001). 
 188 See Christy A. Rentmeester & Robert I. Garis, Rebates and Spreads: Pharmacy Benefit 
Management Practices and Corporate Citizenship, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 943 (2008); 
Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit 
Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 33 (2007); Greg Radinsky, The Spotlight on PBMs: 
Federal Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute on the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management 
Industry, 36 J. HEALTH L. 213 (2003). 
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patients do not act solely as principals, since insurance subsidizes drug 
spending at the point of care, increasing both appropriate and 
inappropriate purchases.189  This effect is magnified by direct-to-
consumer advertising in the United States, boosting consumer demand 
for a product reimbursed by insurance.190  While these agency costs 
have many effects, an important one is dilution of the effectiveness of 
the price mechanism.  Pharmaceutical reimbursement in the United 
States should not be confused with market-based pricing. 
The macroeconomic effect of non-market pricing could result in 
drug price levels that are either super- or sub-optimal from a social 
perspective.191  Antibiotics are a significant drug market, ranked as the 
third most profitable class of drugs in 2004.192  Nevertheless, a leading 
company researcher suggests that antibiotic reimbursement is sub-
optimal.  Steve Projan suggests that three factors uniquely disfavor 
antibiotic reimbursement: (1) conservation reduces unit sales; (2) the 
short duration of therapy (two weeks or less, compared to decades for 
drugs like Lipitor®); and (3) low prices for antibiotics, driven by both 
administered pricing and generic drugs.193  The first factor is a core 
element in H5—conservation dampens production.  As discussed in Part 
III.B supra, conservation reduces unit sales, but it may actually promote 
better types of production and yield net overall social welfare gains.  
The second and third factors (duration and price) support the argument 
that reimbursement is a key driver. 
Drug companies could promote better reimbursement models for 
antibiotics.  Consider the recent introduction of high-priced oncology 
drugs.  As of 2009, more than ninety percent of the oncology drugs 
introduced in the prior four years cost more than $20,000 for a twelve-
week course of treatment.194  These prices are defended by studies 
demonstrating their cost-effectiveness in terms of quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) or similar metrics.  In another paper, Aaron Kesselheim 
and I make the normative claim that if antibiotics generate significant 
health returns, they should bear an appropriate price, without regard to 
the length of treatment.195  A comparative-effectiveness review of 
antibiotics might call for dramatically higher reimbursement to drug 
 
 189 See infra Part III.C.3 and sources cited therein. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Outterson, supra note 39. 
 192 Powers, supra note 72, at 25 (“Today, antimicrobials are the third most profitable class of 
drugs for pharmaceutical companies, surpassed only by central nervous system and 
cardiovascular drugs.  The market for antimicrobials is between $26 [billion] and $45 [billion] per 
year.”). 
 193 Projan, supra note 74, at 428; see also BAD BUGS, supra note 10, at 17. 
 194 Fojo & Grady, supra note 72, at 1045 n.17 & tbl.1. 
 195 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 12-13. 
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companies,196 especially if drug companies only capture a small share of 
the social welfare generated from antibiotic usage. 
If the only concern was production of new antibiotics, greater 
reimbursements and subsidies197 might be effective.  But conservation 
must also be considered.  Deploying tax and reimbursement incentives 
to make production of antibiotics appear artificially cheap is a serious 
error, akin to subsidizing relatively cheap petroleum as supplies 
dwindle.  If we were to analogize a carbon tax to antibiotics, 
government policy might consider making antibiotic production more 
expensive.198  And yet, leading groups suggest myriad tax and patent 
incentives to reduce the cost of antibiotic production.199  These may be 
rational strategies in normal pharmaceutical markets, but may yield 
social welfare losses when applied to exhaustible resources like 
antibiotics. 
 
2.     Provider Incentives for Hospitals and Physicians 
 
Despite the strong case for conservation and stewardship, many 
U.S. academic medical centers do not sustain effective programs.200  
One significant factor is reimbursement: Historically, hospitals have had 
few economic incentives to invest in antibiotic conservation.  Infection 
control has generally been an unreimbursed cost,201 even when proven 
effective.202  Appropriate use and careful stewardship may drive 
 
 196 Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 564-65 (“The most market-based 
remedy for inadequate innovation is to pay more for outstanding innovation.”). 
 197 Drug company reimbursement can come through other channels as well.  Some 
government policies can be considered indirect reimbursement as they reduce the cost of R&D 
and production.  Tax incentives, orphan drug credits, and government support for early-stage 
research can be considered indirect reimbursement mechanisms as they reduce the cost for 
companies to bring products to market. 
 198 By contrast, Kades proposed making antibiotic consumption rather than production more 
expensive.  Kades, supra note 4, at 635-52. 
 199 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
 200 Pakyz, supra note 125; Richard P. Wenzel, Health Care-Associated Infections: Major 
Issues in the Early Years of the 21st Century, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S85, S87 
(2007) (“With respect to basic infection control, there needs to be little tolerance for any lack of 
hand hygiene.  The lack of hygiene compliance is a major failing of modern physicians and other 
health care workers that implies both medical and ethical breaches.  It cannot be tolerated, 
because it is a key quality-of-care issue, and it should be made unacceptable, a part of the annual 
review process, and a reason for disciplinary action in hospitals.”). 
 201 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 6-7. 
 202 Susan S. Huang et al., Impact of Routine Intensive Care Unit Surveillance Cultures and 
Resultant Barrier Precautions on Hospital-Wide Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
Bacteremia, 43 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 971 (2006) (finding that routine surveillance for 
MRSA in the ICU followed by contact isolation of MRSA cases yielded a large and statistically 
significant reduction in MRSA bacteremia). 
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unhappy doctors and patients away,203 and infection control programs 
are not inexpensive to create and sustain.  In fact, hospitals and doctors 
have generally gained revenues from additional infections, whether 
acquired in the community or the hospital.  Most of the economic 
incentives do not favor conservation by providers.204 
Economic incentives are powerful in hospital reimbursement.  In 
fiscal year 1983, Congress switched hospitals from cost-based 
reimbursement to prospective payment.  The program is now called the 
inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS).205  IPPS has led to 
remarkable changes in the average length of stay and the delivery of 
medical services.206  Under IPPS, patients need to be moved out of 
hospitals more quickly for financial reasons.  These pressures select for 
antibiotics, such as linezolid,207 that can be started intravenously and 
then switched to oral doses for post-discharge use, creating unknown 
effects on resistance. 
Reporting infection data is one way to force a hospital to 
internalize some of the costs of nosocomial (hospital-associated) 
infection.  Some states, notably Pennsylvania, require reporting of some 
of this data.208  Medicare is also moving in this direction as a condition 
for reimbursement.209  Routine testing of patients for MRSA on 
admission may also illustrate another negative externality: Hospitals 
 
 203 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 15; Saver, supra note 35, at 431. 
 204 Outterson, supra note 100. 
 205 Social Security Act § 1886(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (2006).  In 1997, Congress created 
a special exception for 1100 rural hospitals (called critical access hospitals).  MEDICARE 
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE 
PROGRAM ch. 7 (2005), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/ 
June05_ch7.pdf.  Critical access hospitals are now exempt from IPPS and are reimbursed on a 
cost basis. 
 206 Jack Ashby, Stuart Guterman & Tim Greene, An Analysis of Hospital Productivity and 
Product Change, 19 HEALTH AFF. 197, 202-04 (2000) (discussing the role of Medicare 
prospective payment on declining length of stay in hospitals).  But see Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe 
E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States 
Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89 ex. 5 (2003) (finding U.S. average 
length of stay in 2000 to be only slightly below the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) median). 
 207 Paterson, supra note 85, at 487 (“The availability of both intravenous and oral formulations 
has facilitated switch therapy, whereby intravenous therapy is commenced and oral therapy is 
substituted upon hospital discharge.”). 
 208 See Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, Hospital-Acquired Infections in 
Pennsylvania, http://www.phc4.org/hai (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (containing interactive 
databases of hospital-acquired infections). 
 209 In the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Congress offered a “pay for reporting” bonus 
to hospitals, paying additional Medicare reimbursement (through the Annual Payment Update or 
APU) in exchange for reporting some hospital quality measures, including some hospital-
associated infection data.  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.  The law was amended through the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5001(a), 120 Stat. 4 (amending section 1886(d)(3)(B) of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1395ww(d)(4) (2002)).  The first ten hospital quality measures 
were proposed for reporting as of November 1, 2003. 
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and long-term care facilities with poor records of infection control may 
be exporting MRSA to other hospitals, economically damaging the 
competition, as discussed in Part II.C supra concerning hypothesis H7 
(antibiotic externalities are predominantly negative). 
Physicians are also subject to pressures to prescribe antibiotics in 
the community, especially empirical (best-guess) therapy while waiting 
for a diagnostic test result to confirm bacterial origin.  As Richard Saver 
has recently described, the cultural, legal, and financial incentives in the 
United States support overutilization rather than rational use or 
conservation, leading to premature resistance.210  Since physicians write 
prescriptions, any plan to socially optimize antibiotic use must 
overcome these barriers. 
 
3.     Consumer Pricing Through Insurance 
 
Most U.S. drug purchases are paid through health insurance.  
Health insurance changes the price elasticities of prescription drugs, 
making them more affordable to the patient at the point of care.  
Flattening the price elasticity curve increases consumer demand for 
prescription drugs, which, on balance, may be a good thing.  But 
increased demand can be counterproductive if the drugs are used 
inappropriately (wasted); are unsafe for that patient (internal costs); or 
contribute to resistance generally (internal and external costs).  The 
structure of consumer out-of-pocket payments may encourage 
inappropriate use.  Pricing systems that make antibiotics cheap at the 
point of care may stimulate unnecessary demand.211  For example, Wal-
Mart’s $4 generics program is problematic if it stimulates inappropriate 
overutilization of antibiotics.212  Pharmacies at the Publix grocery chain 
announced a rival offer of free generic antibiotics, including 
amoxicillin, cephalexin, sulfamethoxazole/trimethoprim, ciprofloxacin, 
penicillin, ampicillin, and erythromycin.213  Free antibiotics are the 
opposite of Pigovian taxes to correct for antibiotic negative 
externalities.214 
 
 210 Saver, supra note 35, at 431. 
 211 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 69-70 (discussing the policy option of increasing 
co-pays to discourage inappropriate antibiotic use). 
 212 Posting of Sarah Rubenstein to the Wall Street Journal Health Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/05/04/wal-mart-tries-to-step-on-pharmacy-benefit-managers-
turf/ (May 4, 2009, 10:55 EST). 
 213 Press Release, Publix, Publix Pharmacies Launch Free Prescription Drug Program in All 
Operating Areas (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.publix.com/about/newsroom/ 
NewsReleaseItem.do?newsReleaseItemPK=2636. 
 214 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 80, and sources cited therein; 
Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 16. 
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 In summation, this Part III has argued that: (1) resistance 
stimulates innovation (H4); (2) conservation should be increasingly 
favored over production of new antibiotics with more dangerous side 
effect profiles; and (3) insurance reimbursement systems are a key 
policy lever for antibiotic effectiveness and may be more effective than 
patent law.  We now proceed to the case study on vancomycin. 
 
IV.     TESTING THE PREDICTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF VANCOMYCIN 
 
Vancomycin is a major antibiotic with a relatively well-developed 
literature on resistance.215  A recent study found vancomycin to be the 
single most commonly used antibacterial in U.S. hospitals.216  Two 
other antibiotics experienced significant increases in utilization during 
the study period, namely carbapenems (fifty-nine percent increase) and 
piperacillin-tazobactam (eighty-four percent increase).217  Among the 
three, only vancomycin was fully off patent and thus directly relevant 
for this Article.  Accordingly, the focus will be on vancomycin, with 
references to other drugs as appropriate.218 
A major public health concern is the potential emergence of 
vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) and vancomycin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA).219  A review study on vancomycin 
introduced the situation: “Staphylococcus aureus resistance to 
vancomycin is one of the greatest concerns in infectious diseases.  Over 
the past 50 years this common pathogen has demonstrated a remarkable 
ability to overcome many classes of antibiotics; however, vancomycin 
has largely remained unscathed.”220 
This Part IV.A compares the case history of vancomycin with the 
seven hypotheses described in Table 2 supra.  The biological focus will 
be on two major infections treated by vancomycin: Clostridium difficile-
associated disease (CDAD) treated with oral vancomycin, and 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) treated with 
intravenous vancomycin.221  The institutional focus will be on two 
 
 215 A PubMed search for “vancomycin and resistance” yielded 8092 articles, including 1123 
review articles.  PubMed, http://preview.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
 216 Pakyz et al., supra note 126, at 2258. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Given the significant increases in utilization of carbapenems and piperacillin-tazobactam, 
these examples should be explored in a future study as possible examples of patent holder waste. 
 219 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10. 
 220 James S. Lewis II & Michael W. Ellis, Approaches to Serious Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus Infections with Decreased Susceptibility to Vancomycin: Clinical 
Significance and Options for Management, 20 CURRENT OPINION INFECTIOUS DISEASES 568 
(2007). 
 221 We will also explore important infections other than MRSA and CDAD in certain contexts, 
including VRE. 
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actors: drug companies and hospitals.222  We begin by exploring the 
market for vancomycin, including its patent history, to uncover the 
relationships between resistance, conservation, and production.  Part 
IV.B then explores some unique questions about antibiotic class 
coordination.  Part IV.C offers some conclusions regarding the seven 
hypotheses. 
 
A.     The Market for Vancomycin 
 
Vancomycin may be a natural experiment in the merits of limited 
antibiotic use in a drug’s early years, preserving bacterial susceptibility 
(non-resistance) for times of greater clinical necessity.  Vancomycin 
retains significant clinical effectiveness more than fifty years after its 
introduction, due in part to modest sales in its first decades. 
 
Chart 2.  U.S. Vancomycin Sales, in Kilograms, 1975-2007223 
 
Vancomycin remains a major antibiotic today, and is often an antibiotic 
of last resort.  Eli Lilly & Company introduced vancomycin in 1958 to 
treat infections no longer susceptible to penicillin.224  Shortly after its 
introduction, vancomycin was suspected of various toxicities and was 
 
 222 While many studies of antibiotics also focus on community prescription by doctors, Saver, 
supra note 35, vancomycin is generally prescribed in hospitals and institutions in the United 
States. 
 223 Data from 1997 to 2007 are from IMS Data, supra note 127 (U.S. R&H, Antibiotics J1X1); 
data from 1975-1996 are from Herbert A. Kirst et al., Historical Yearly Usage of Vancomycin, 42 
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1303 (1998). 
 224 Ruth Brown & Richard Wise, Vancomycin: A Reappraisal, 284 BRITISH MED. J. 1508 
(1982). 
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quickly overtaken in the market by methicillin and other synthetic 
penicillins.225  Limited utilization in the 1960s and 1970s conserved 
vancomycin for important uses that emerged in the 1980s and beyond.  
In 1982, an article in the British Medical Journal suggested exactly this 
linkage: “Probably the high cost and potential toxicity will help to 
preserve this very useful agent from abuse, which experience shows 
usually leads to resistance emerging—a rare problem as yet with 
vancomycin.”226 
Note that the successful initial conservation of vancomycin was 
largely a medical accident rather than a deliberate patent holder strategy 
(compare H2, patent holder conservation).227  The key was 
vancomycin’s relative clinical profile during the first two and a half 
decades following its introduction in 1958.228  The early preservation of 
vancomycin was not due to thoughtful conservation efforts.  Guidelines 
came much later, beginning in 1995 with the publications by the CDC 
and the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee.229  
These guidelines, and others that followed, encouraged clinicians to use 
metronidazole as the first-line treatment for CDAD, primarily to slow 
resistance to vancomycin.230 
Vancomycin’s sales and patent data do not fit the patent holder 
waste hypothesis (H1).  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 
the first vancomycin patent to Eli Lilly & Company in 1962.  During 
the patent period, vancomycin was a relatively poor seller.  Sales 
became significant only after the original patent expired in December 
1979.231  From patent expiration until first competitive entry, 
vancomycin sales grew as medical needs changed, especially after 1984.  
The growing sales of patent-expired vancomycin attracted the attention 
of other companies.  The first intravenous vancomycin Abbreviated 
 
 225 Id.; Donald P. Levine, Vancomycin: A History, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S5 
(2006). 
 226 Brown & Wise, supra note 224, at 1509. 
 227 Perhaps a major first-in-class antibiotic patent should be purchased in every country and 
held in strategic reserve for the protection of future global public health.  The analogy is to the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve.  The concept of a Strategic Antibiotic Reserve will be explored in a 
future article. 
 228 Patents may have kept the cost higher than substitutable alternatives, but Eli Lilly could 
have experimented with pricing elasticities to stimulate demand.  Vancomycin’s medical 
limitations were the key market constraint. 
 229 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations for Preventing the Spread 
of Vancomycin Resistance: Recommendations of the Hospital Infection Control Practices 
Advisory Committee (HICPAC), MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (RECOMMENDATIONS 
& REP.), Sept. 22, 1995, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/RR/RR4412.pdf. 
 230 Dale N. Gerding, Metronidazole for Clostridium difficile-Associated Disease—Is It Okay 
for Mom?, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1598, 1598 (2005) (reserving oral vancomycin for 
“severe, potentially life-threatening cases or when oral metronidazole cannot be used”). 
 231 Levine, supra note 225, at S7; U.S. Patent No. 3,067,099 (filed Sept. 16, 1955) (issued 
Dec. 4, 1962). 
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New Drug Application (ANDA) was approved on March 17, 1987,232 
nearly eight years after vancomycin’s patent expiration.  Another 
competitor received five intravenous vancomycin ANDA approvals 
from 1988 to 1992.233  While sales continued to grow in the following 
decades, the upward trend line was already firmly established prior to 
competitive generic entry.  Sales leveled off in the mid-1990s, 
corresponding with entry of the first oral generic.234  In the last decade, 
vancomycin sales have experienced significant growth.  As described in 
Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 infra, medical need, rather than clever 
marketing, drove sales. 
Other explanations are possible as well.  One could argue that the 
upturn in sales after patent expiration was a last-ditch attempt by Eli 
Lilly to obtain profits from a disappointing drug.  If that was the case, 
sales should have spiked prior to expiration, as an example of patent 
holder waste (H1).  But the sales data in Chart 2 demonstrate relatively 
flat sales until 1980, after patent expiration.  Another complicating 
factor is that patent expiration did not lead to immediate generic 
competition in the years prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act.235  Perhaps 
patent holder waste is only a problem after Hatch-Waxman, which 
suggests a more limited reform to antibiotic patents. 
Levine identifies two medical developments explaining the 
remarkable growth in vancomycin use in the early 1980s: expansion of 
the clinical indications for oral vancomycin against intestinal infections 
such as CDAD; and the emergence of MRSA driving demand for 
intravenous vancomycin.236  These two environmental changes radically 
altered the market for both forms of vancomycin.  As described in the 
following Parts, vancomycin sales were a response to medical need, not 
a marketing or patent story.  If so, then vancomycin is not a good 
example of patent holder waste (H1). 
 
 232 ANDA 062663 (APP Pharmaceuticals); see U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
Drugs@FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm [hereinafter 
Drugs@FDA] (search “Search by Drug Name, Active Ingredient, or Application Number” for 
“062663”). 
 233 ANDAs 062911, 062912, 062931, 062933, and 063076 were filed by Hospira during this 
period for injectible vancomycin.  See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Orange Book Active 
Ingredient Search, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/queryai.cfm [hereinafter 
U.S. FDA, Orange Book] (search “Search by Active Ingredient” for “vancomycin”). 
 234 Due to the high cost of oral vancomycin, some physicians administered the intravenous 
version orally.  Kirst et al., supra note 223. 
 235 See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in 
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 215-16 
(2005). 
 236 Levine, supra note 225. 
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1.     Oral Use of Vancomycin for CDAD 
 
Vancomycin is not well absorbed in the body.  For most infections 
it must be given intravenously.  For some infections in the intestinal 
tract, oral use is appropriate.  The FDA has approved oral vancomycin 
to treat two intestinal conditions: Clostridium difficile-associated 
disease (CDAD), and enterocolitis caused by Staphylococcus aureus, 
including methicillin-resistant strains.237  CDAD is a painful, long-
lasting, and potentially deadly diarrheal disease.  Medical expenses 
related to CDAD are significant, in the range of $2,400 to $7,100 per 
case,238 with over 250,000 cases in 2005.239  The market was worth 
$600 million to $1.7 billion in 2005.  Today, CDAD remains a billion 
dollar business240 and is primarily associated with antibiotic use.241 
Prior broad-spectrum antibiotic use dramatically alters the natural 
flora in the intestines, permitting more virulent and toxic strains of 
Clostridium difficile to flourish in the vacant ecological niche.  
Antibiotic use is a frequent cause of CDAD, which makes it a 
nosocomial (hospital-associated) infection.242  Oral vancomycin is the 
only drug approved by the FDA for the treatment of this condition, but 
 
 237 The label for Eli Lilly’s oral vancomycin includes treatment of staphylococcal enterocolitis 
and antibiotic-associated pseudomembranous colitis caused by Clostridium difficile.  See the 
FDA-approved drug label for Vancocin HCl (vancomycin), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2004/50606slr020_vancocin_lbl.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010).  See also Dale N. Gerding, Is There a Relationship Between Vancomycin-
Resistant Enterococcal Infection and Clostridium difficile Infection?, 25 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES S206 (1997); ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 2, 2006). 
 238 Erik R. Dubberke et al., Short- and Long-Term Attributable Costs of Clostridium difficile-
Associated Disease in Nonsurgical Inpatients, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 497 (2008). 
 239 L. Clifford McDonald, Confronting Clostridium difficile in Inpatient Health Care 
Facilities, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1274 (2007).  Only a small portion of these 
expenses are for drugs; the largest component is longer hospitalizations and medical services. 
 240 The patent holder for oritavancin estimates the U.S. cost of nosocomial diarrhea at over 
$1.1 billion annually, primarily as a result of increased hospital stays.  Targanta Therapeutics, 
Pipeline—Oritavancin Program, http://www.targanta.com/pipeline/oritavancin.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2010). 
 241 David B. Blossom & L. Clifford McDonald, The Challenges Posed by Reemerging 
Clostridium difficile Infection, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 222 (2007) (noting that 
CDAD is a health care-associated disease associated with antibiotic use in the hospital). 
 242 Gaetano Privitera et al., Prospective Study of Clostridium difficile Intestinal Colonization 
and Disease Following Single-Dose Antibiotic Prophylaxis in Surgery, 35 ANTIMICROBIAL 
AGENTS AND CHEMOTHERAPY 208 (1991).  Oral vancomycin use is also a risk factor for 
intestinal fungal infections by Candida species.  Ines Zollner-Schwetz et al., Oral and Intestinal 
Candida Colonization in Patients Undergoing Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Transplantation, 198 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 150 (2008).  Other studies have found similar effects from metronidazole 
and ciprofloxacin.  Robert Krause et al., Role of Candida in Antibiotic-Associated Diarrhea, 184 
J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1065 (2001). 
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generic metronidazole is used off-label as the first-line treatment for 
CDAD.243 
The FDA has approved only two New Drug Applications (NDAs) 
for oral forms of vancomycin: Eli Lilly’s Vancocin® and Lederle’s 
Vancoled.244  Eli Lilly was the first to market, receiving approval from 
the FDA on April 15, 1986.245  Lederle’s oral vancomycin was 
approved on October 15, 1993, but sales were disappointing.246  The 
bloom was off the rose for oral vancomycin in the mid-1990s as 
concerns mounted about vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE).  The 
volume of medical literature on vancomycin exploded from 1994 to 
1997, and hospital clinicians increasingly restricted its use. 
Oral vancomycin was historically a relatively small portion of total 
vancomycin consumption in the United States,247 but a larger percentage 
of the sales revenues due to higher unit prices, peaking at about eighty 
percent of the glycopeptide class revenues in FY 1994.248  Eli Lilly’s 
oral Vancocin® sales peaked in 1994, declining significantly until 
2003.249  The peak in 1994 coincided with published guidelines 
suggesting restrictions on the use of oral vancomycin for CDAD in 
order to limit the spread of VRE.250  This Sector 3 conservation program 
appears to have reduced sales in the 1990s, consistent with H5, 
conservation dampens production.  Sales in the last decade are shown in 
Chart 3: 
 
 243 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 2, 2006). 
 244 See Drugs@FDA, supra note 232 (search for “vancocin” and “vancoled”); U.S. FDA, 
Orange Book, supra note 233 (search for “vancomycin”).  Eli Lilly transferred the rights to 
Vancocin to Baxter Healthcare, which was awarded NDA 050606 on April 15, 1986, and 
subsequently to ViroPharma, which received NDA 050671 on April 29, 1993. 
 245 See Drugs@FDA, supra note 232 (search for “vancocin”; follow “VANCOCIN 
HYDROCHLORIDE” hyperlink; then follow “NDA #050606” hyperlink; then follow “Approval 
History, Letters, Reviews, and Related Documents” hyperlink); Levine, supra note 225, at S7 
fig.2.  Apparently, some oral consumption occurred prior to approval in 1985. 
 246 See Drugs@FDA, supra note 232 (search for “vancoled”; follow “ANDA #063321” 
hyperlink; then follow “Approval History, Letters, Reviews, and Related Documents” hyperlink); 
Levine, supra note 225, at S7 fig.2. 
 247 IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1); see also Kirst et al., supra 
note 223, at 1303 (noting that the intravenous version of vancomycin could be given orally as 
well); Levine, supra note 225, at S7. 
 248 IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1, FYE Oct. 1994). 
 249 Id. 
 250 Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, Recommendations for 
Preventing the Spread of Vancomycin Resistance, 16 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 105 (1995). 
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Chart 3.  Oral Vancomycin251 and Oral Metronidazole Sales,252 U.S. 
Sales 1993-2007253 (in Thousands of 1997 U.S. Dollars) 
 
 
 
The patent holder waste hypothesis (H1) suggests, by analogy, that 
competitive market entry by Lederle in 1993 would have resulted in 
overzealous marketing and waste.254  That does not seem to have been 
the case here.  Perhaps Lederle’s timing was poor, but overall constant 
dollar sales of oral vancomycin declined from 1993-2003.255  Sales of 
Lederle’s oral vancomycin (Vancoled) were very small, less than seven 
percent of the glycopeptide class in 1994 and falling rapidly 
thereafter.256  Vancoled sales dwindled through the next decade, falling 
to $183,000 in 2002 before Lederle discontinued its product.257 
The market for oral vancomycin changed dramatically in 2004.  Eli 
Lilly followed Lederle by exiting the U.S. oral vancomycin market in 
November 2004, selling its U.S. rights to ViroPharma for $116 million 
 
 251 IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1, J1X1 Vancocin and Vancoled). 
 252 IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1, Metronidazole G1A1 
Trichomonacides and A2B4 Bismuth antiulcerants).  Since metronidazole is not approved for 
CDAD, it is difficult to know exactly what IMS category is appropriate, but I excluded the topical 
uses, leaving primarily tablet forms. 
 253 Oral metronidazole sales prior to 1997 are not available and have been estimated by the 
author.  Dollar amounts were adjusted by the author according to the Consumer Price Index: All 
Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average.  See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Consumer Price Index: All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), U.S. City Average, 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 254 See supra Part II.C. 
 255 IMS Data, supra note 127 (FYE Oct. 2004); see also Levine, supra note 225, at S7 fig.2. 
 256 IMS Data, supra note 127 (FYE Oct. 1994). 
 257 IMS Data, supra note 127 (FYE Oct. 2002). 
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cash plus royalties on future sales.258  The royalty structure gave 
ViroPharma a strong financial incentive to keep sales above $65 
million.259  ViroPharma was remarkably successful, almost doubling the 
sales targets in 2005, with net sales exceeding $125 million.260  This 
was by far the best sales year in the history of oral vancomycin.  In 
nominal dollars, sales reached $166.7 million in 2006,261 $203.7 million 
in 2007,262 and $232.3 million in 2008, driven by both unit sales and 
price increases.263  The dramatic jump in sales of oral vancomycin 
certainly looks like patent holder waste (H1) and perhaps also a 
negation of patent holder conservation (H2), but on closer examination 
the facts do not fit the theory. 
Two possible explanations will now be explored for these dramatic 
sales figures.  The first is a property rights story, driven by aggressive 
marketing.  The second is a medical story, driven by epidemiological 
factors beyond the company’s control. 
Certainly the royalty structure gave ViroPharma a strong incentive 
to keep sales above $65 million per year.  Until October 2008, 
ViroPharma was completely dependent on sales of Vancocin®.264  
While other products are in development, Vancocin® accounts for one 
hundred percent of the company’s current product sales.265  And yet, as 
late as December 31, 2006, ViroPharma did not have a sales staff.266  
Doctors prescribe Vancocin® primarily in hospitals and long term care 
facilities, and a very small marketing staff of six people achieved the 
tremendous increase in sales: 
We currently have a limited marketing staff and do not have a sales 
staff.  We focus on educational initiatives, including thought leader 
development, physician education, and the targeted education of 
health professionals, by utilizing a small number of regional medical 
 
 258 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1, 6, 40 (Mar. 15, 2005).  ViroPharma 
acquired the U.S. rights to Vancocin from Eli Lilly & Company in November 2004.  Eli Lilly 
retained rights in the rest of the world and continued to produce the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient under contract with ViroPharma until 2006.  The royalty structure is found on page 40, 
and models sales in the range of $44-$65 million per year.  Id. 
 259 ViroPharma paid a fifty percent royalty in 2005 on sales between $44 million and $65 
million, but no royalty for sales above or below that corridor.  The royalty percentage falls to 
thirty-five percent from 2006 to 2011, when it expires.  ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 
10-K), at 4 (Mar. 2, 2006). 
 260 Id. at 36 (without adjustment for inflation). 
 261 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 36 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 262 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 36 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
 263 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 47 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 264 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Mar. 2, 2006); ViroPharma Inc. 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7 (May 4, 2009) (describing acquisition of Lev 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and their drug, Cinryze). 
 265 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 51 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 266 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
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science liaisons.  As of December 31, 2006, we have six members in 
our regional medical scientist team.267 
In the first quarter of 2008, ViroPharma finally spent $2.7 million 
for a hospital sales force to promote Vancocin®.268  By the end of 2008, 
these expenses had grown to $12.6 million for the Vancocin® sales 
force.269  Sales growth has declined even as marketing expenses have 
significantly increased, and the great bulk of sales growth occurred 
before any marketing began.  Vancocin® is not a marketing-driven 
story. 
The more likely explanation for this dramatic growth lies in the 
CDAD market and growing resistance to metronidazole.  Some strains 
of Clostridium difficile evolved into a “hypervirulent” pathogen of 
growing concern since 2001, driving the demand for therapy.270  
Researchers have not yet identified the mutation responsible for this 
more dangerous form of Clostridium difficile.271  The primary 
alternative to oral vancomycin has been metronidazole, but it faces 
increasing treatment failure for this severe form of CDAD.272  
Hospitalizations affected by CDAD have grown from 98,000 in 2000 to 
an estimated 250,000 in 2005.273  This accounts for the majority of 
Vancocin®’s growth274: 
Vancocin has been reserved by physicians for patients who have 
failed metronidazole therapy, who have relapsed or who are 
suffering from severe forms of CDAD.  We believe that the 
epidemiological shift that has contributed to increased incidence and 
severity of CDAD has led to an increase in the use of Vancocin.275 
 
 267 Id. 
 268 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 28, 2008); ViroPharma Inc., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 20 (Apr. 30, 2008). 
 269 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 270 McDonald, supra note 239, at 1274 (noting that the hypervirulent strain of Clostridium 
difficile emerged in 2001 when it developed high levels of fluoroquinolone resistance); Dale N. 
Gerding, Carlene A. Muto & Robert C. Owens, Jr., Measures to Control and Prevent Clostridium 
difficile Infection, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S43, S43 (2008). 
 271 Ruth Murray et al., Truncation in the tcdC Region of the Clostridium difficile PathLoc of 
Clinical Isolates Does Not Predict Increased Biological Activity of Toxin B or Toxin A, 9 BMC 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 103 (2009). 
 272 Gerding is quite careful in his evaluation of the recent data on metronidazole treatment 
failure.  Gerding, supra note 230, at 1600.  The marketer of Vancocin® is less cautious.  
ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 28, 2008) (“We believe that changes in 
the epidemiology of CDI, in particular the increasing frequency of severe disease, and data 
suggesting that failure or relapse occur more commonly in patients treated with metronidazole 
have led to an increase in the use of Vancocin.”). 
 273 McDonald, supra note 239.  Research in 2009 confirms that CDAD continues to be a 
serious problem.  Jyotsna Jagai & Elena Naumova,  Clostridium difficile-associated Disease in 
the Elderly, United States, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 343 (2009). 
 274 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 275 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 2, 2006). 
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This finding is consistent with the claim that resistance stimulates 
innovation (H4).  A product’s obsolescence through resistance276 creates 
a market for another substitutable product.  Here, for example, 
resistance created CDAD, and wrought destruction on existing 
treatments such as metronidazole, opening the way for oral 
vancomycin.277  Of course oral vancomycin was not a new treatment, 
but it had been temporarily sidelined due to its side effects and cost.  
Metronidazole was originally the better drug, but with resistance 
metronidazole lost absolute efficacy, and at some point metronidazole 
became relatively less effective than oral vancomycin, especially for the 
hypervirulent form of CDAD.278 
Several other observations can be drawn that contrast with some 
theoretical predictions.  A key assumption in the patent holder waste 
hypothesis (H1) is the threat of competitive entry by generic firms, 
leading to a tragedy of the antibiotic commons.279  The oral vancomycin 
(Vancocin®) story is quite different.  First, despite generic entry in 
1993 and the expiration of the last core oral patent in 1996, Vancocin® 
remains the only oral form of vancomycin on the U.S. market today.280  
But sales at current levels attract competitive attention.  In March 2006, 
ViroPharma filed an administrative petition to stay the approval of a 
competitive oral vancomycin product on the grounds of inadequate 
bioequivalence.281  ViroPharma is relying on non-patent intellectual 
property and regulatory barriers to defend its lucrative market from 
 
 276 It appears that metronidazole’s growing treatment failure is not a result of resistance to 
metronidazole itself, but due to increased use of other antibiotics.  Daniel M. Musher et al., 
Relatively Poor Outcomes After Treatment of Clostridium difficile Colitis with Metronidazole, 40 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1586, 1589 (2005) (“Specific resistance to metronidazole was 
probably not a factor, because strains of C. difficile resistant to this drug have not been identified 
at our medical center.”).  For fluoroquinolones, the mechanism is accumulated resistance.  
McDonald, supra note 239. 
 277 Evidence-based guidelines from the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 
(SHEA) and the Infectious Diseases Society of American (IDSA) have noted the shifting need for 
oral vancomycin to treat severe or recurrent CDAD.  See ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 
10-K), at 2 (Feb. 28, 2008).  The triggering event was the emergence in 2001 of the hypervirulent 
strain exhibiting high levels of fluoroquinolone resistance.  McDonald, supra note 239; Rocco 
Ricciardi et al., Increasing Prevalence and Severity of Clostridium difficile Colitis in 
Hospitalized Patients in the United States, 142 ARCHIVES SURGERY 624 (2007). 
 278 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 279 See supra Part II.C. 
 280 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2, 11, 25 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 281 Letter from Michel de Rosen, Chief Executive Officer, ViroPharma Inc., to Andrew C. von 
Eschenbach, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs, FDA (Mar. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dockets/06p0124/06p-0124-let0001.pdf.  The petition 
was filed pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.35.  See also ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-Q), 
at 9 (Apr. 30, 2008).  This filing compelled the company to evaluate an impairment or change in 
the useful life of its vancomycin-related intangibles under SFAS No. 144.  Id.  I resist the urge to 
explore the impact of U.S. public accounting standards on antibiotic resistance, but perhaps 
someone else will engage in such an exploration. 
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generic competition.282  In 2009, ViroPharma devoted millions of 
dollars in legal fees to continue to delay market entry by this potential 
competitor.283  Non-patent barriers can significantly delay generic entry. 
Second, the threat of competitive generic entry has stimulated 
paradigm-breaking R&D at ViroPharma.  The company has begun a 
research program to isolate non-toxigenic strains of Clostridium difficile 
to be used as a re-colonization treatment after oral vancomycin.284  This 
is an interesting project, headed by a leading Clostridium difficile 
scientist, Dr. Dale Gerding.  This small research program might side 
step the entire question of resistance by colonizing the ecological space 
with non-toxic Clostridium difficile bacteria.285  Phase I trials should 
begin in 2009.286  Not all responses to the threat of competitive generic 
entry waste the antibiotic commons, a point that is relevant to both H4 
(resistance stimulates innovation) and H1 (patent holder waste). 
Third, while H2 (patent holder conservation) suggests private 
coordination under a single patent holder, Eli Lilly chose to fragment its 
rights to oral vancomycin by a license to ViroPharma, diminishing its 
ability to coordinate on a global basis.  This license occurred just as oral 
vancomycin sales took off.  Eli Lilly retained the rights outside the 
United States, and also continued to produce (for a time) intravenous 
vancomycin.  This property fragmentation occurred despite concerns 
that oral vancomycin might contribute significantly to resistance.  
Available data suggests that oral prescriptions of vancomycin may 
create proportionately higher risks of VRE, but the datasets are 
remarkably small.287  If the case is to be made for patent-based 
coordination as an effective conservation strategy, oral vancomycin for 
CDAD is not a good example.  If scholars proffer other antibiotics as 
 
 282 Of course, Vancocin® has faced generic competition from metronidazole for years.  My 
statement refers to generic vancomycin. 
 283 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Mar. 2, 2009) (noting that legal fees 
to delay the ANDA were $3.3 million in 2007, $4 million in 2008, and the company will spend at 
“higher levels in future periods”).  If generic entry boosted sales, then this litigation might still be 
socially desirable as a conservation tool (H2).  As seen above, generic entry does not necessarily 
increase unit sales, since marketing tapers off with generic entry.  See Lichtenberg & Duflos, supra 
note 68. 
 284 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
 285 For a careful caution on probiotic commensal therapies, see Bernard Dixon, It’s a Little Bit 
More Complicated than That, 9 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 399 (2009). 
 286 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 287 In 1997, Gerding tried to suggest that oral vancomycin contributed modestly to VRE 
overall, given the small volume of oral prescriptions at the time, but he did not deny the relatively 
greater effect.  Gerding, supra note 239 (noting as unclear the relationship between route of 
administration and resistance); Levine, supra note 225, at S7.  Other studies also raise concerns, 
e.g., Philippe Van der Auwera et al., Influence of Oral Glycopeptides on the Fecal Flora of 
Human Volunteers: Selection of Highly Glycopeptide-Resistant Enterococci, 173 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1129 (1996), but the relationships remain unclear.  Neil Woodford, Glycopeptide-
Resistant Enterococci: A Decade of Experience, 47 J. MED. MICROBIOLOGY 849 (1998).  All of 
these studies occurred before the explosion of oral vancomycin use since 2004. 
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examples of patent holder waste (H1), this study of oral vancomycin 
suggests that we must carefully study the patent holder’s incentives 
before reaching any conclusions.  Next, we turn to another major use of 
vancomycin, as an intravenous treatment for MRSA. 
 
2.     Intravenous Vancomycin for MRSA 
 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a major 
public health hazard with growing significance.288  The infectious 
disease community has been tracking the rise of MRSA for decades,289 
and vancomycin is today the most frequently chosen antibiotic for 
MRSA.290  The increased prevalence of MRSA increases demand for 
vancomycin291 and other useful antibiotics.  While antibiotic innovation 
in general is said to be moribund,292 MRSA innovation appears to be 
flourishing, with many compounds in clinical trials.293  This is a 
plausible example of hypothesis H4 (resistance stimulates 
innovation).294  The multibillion-dollar MRSA market has attracted 
significant market entrants with new products in the pipeline.  In the 
2009 “Fierce 15” list of the most promising small biotech companies, 
four were working on anti-infective therapies, including novel 
treatments for multi-drug resistant gram-negative bacteria, MRSA, 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and novel vaccines for genital herpes and 
 
 288 Eili Klein, David L. Smith & Ramanan Laxminarayan, Hospitalizations and Deaths 
Caused by Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999-2005, 13 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1840 (2007); R. Monina Klevens et al., Invasive Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus Infections in the United States, 298 JAMA 1763 (2007). 
 289 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10; ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, 
SHADOW EPIDEMIC: THE GROWING MENACE OF DRUG RESISTANCE 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/print/GAARD.pdf.  For examples abroad, see COMM. ON SCI. & 
TECH., HOUSE OF LORDS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—SEVENTH REPORT: RESISTANCE TO 
ANTIBIOTICS AND OTHER ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS ¶ 1.5 (1998), available at http:// 
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/081vii/st0702.htm; and 
Nordberg et al., supra note 2. 
 290 Klevens et al., supra note 288. 
 291 Klein et al., supra note 288, at 1844; Donald P Levine, Vancomycin: Understanding Its 
Past and Preserving Its Future, 101 S. MED. J. 284 (2008) (noting that the increased use of 
vancomycin in the 1980s to treat MRSA has led to the emergence of VRE and VRSA). 
 292 BAD BUGS, supra note 10; Norrby et al., supra note 78; Talbot et al., supra note 40; 
Wenzel, supra note 2.  But see Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 562. 
 293 Ursula Theuretzbacher, Future Antibiotics Scenarios: Is the Tide Starting to Turn?, 34 
INT’L J. ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS 15 (2009) (finding in the past decade a wave of Gram-positive 
innovation driven by resistance, especially MRSA, and predicting a coming wave of Gram-
negative innovation, also driven by resistance); Klein et al., supra note 288, at 1844. 
 294 Theuretzbacher, supra note 293, at 15 (“Still, many years passed before an ever-increasing 
mass of critical public health concerns regarding the rapid rise of MRSA forced open a market 
niche window leading to a wave of anti-Gram-positive R&D mainly in small companies.”). 
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pandemic and seasonal influenza.295  Drug companies are attracted to 
these markets. 
A recent article by Klein, Smith, and Laxminarayan reviewed the 
costs of MRSA in the United States.  They drew similar conclusions on 
the relationship between MRSA and demand for vancomycin: 
Another important implication of our analysis is that the increasing 
incidence of MRSA in hospitalized patients, whether the infection 
was acquired in the hospital or the community, is likely to increase 
the demand for vancomycin.  Despite several new (daptomycin, 
linezolid, tigecycline) and old (trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, 
clindamycin) antimicrobial drugs available for treatment of MRSA 
infections, vancomycin has remained the first-line drug for treating 
MRSA.  This pattern has broad implications for the future control of 
MRSA as well as other pathogens.  S. aureus infections resistant to 
vancomycin are already emerging, and vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci are already a major problem in hospitals.  Vancomycin 
use should be restricted to methicillin-resistant S. aureus infections 
and used only for MRSA infections in situations where other drugs 
are not appropriate.296 
Note the interesting relationship between VRE and emerging 
MRSA markets.  If vancomycin were not showing some signs of 
resistance, the incentive to create new compounds would be 
weakened.297  Of course, if vancomycin were immune to resistance, the 
medical need for new antibiotics would be much less pressing.  The 
potential obsolescence of vancomycin and other antibacterial agents is a 
very important factor in creating new markets for MRSA drugs.298  
Prominent examples include telavancin, a glycopeptide patented by 
Theravance.299  Researchers have reported Phase 3 trials demonstrating 
noninferiority of telavancin against vancomycin for hospital-associated 
pneumonia (HAP) caused by MRSA and complicated skin and skin 
structure infections (cSSSI) caused by MRSA.300  If approved by the 
 
 295 Posting of Christopher P. Singer to Patent Docs: Biotech and Pharma Patent Law and News 
Blog, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/fiercebiotech-announces-fierce-15-for-2009.html (June 
30, 2009). 
 296 Klein et al., supra note 288, at 1844 (citations omitted). 
 297 Indeed, in the words of Theravance’s scientists, “[t]he emergence and spread of bacterial 
resistance to vancomycin, in important antibiotic to treat serious infections caused by gram-
positive bacteria, has prompted active research to discover new glycopeptides and semisynthetic 
analogs with improved antimicrobial properties.”  Deborah L. Higgins et al., Telavancin, a 
Multifunctional Lipoglycopeptide, Disrupts Both Cell Wall Synthesis and Cell Membrane 
Integrity in Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 49 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & 
CHEMOTHERAPY 1127 (2005). 
 298 Theuretzbacher, supra note 293, at 15 (“Antibiotics focused on Gram-positive bacteria, 
including MRSA, are proving to be commercially attractive and are encouraging investment in 
R&D, as has been shown with the commercial success of Pfizer’s linezolid and later Cubist’s 
daptomycin in the USA.”). 
 299 Higgins et al., supra note 297. 
 300 Samuel E. Wilson et al., Telavancin Versus Vancomycin for the Treatment of Complicated 
OUTTERSON.31-3 1/28/2010  6:09:35 PM 
668 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:3 
FDA, the market for telavancin will have been created, in large part, by 
growing resistance to vancomycin and the fear of a widespread outbreak 
of vancomycin-resistant S. aureus (VRSA).  Similar concerns motivated 
the research programs for daptomycin, tigecycline, and linezolid, three 
first-in-class antibiotics.301  But none of these drugs work better than 
vancomycin against MRSA,302 at least not yet. 
Conversely, effective conservation methods dampen the immediate 
need for new antibiotics.303  Linezolid is a new first-in-class antibiotic 
that is increasingly used in lieu of vancomycin for ventilator-associated 
pneumonia.304  As Paterson notes, the clinical evidence for preferring 
linezolid to vancomycin is subject to important questions,305 another 
way of saying that, absent resistance, vancomycin might be the better 
drug.  Linezolid is still under patent, which means the company can 
attempt to persuade doctors to switch to linezolid based on these 
studies.  If intravenous vancomycin were still patented, it is likely that 
the patent holder would market to physicians to point out the 
weaknesses in these studies and to try to curtail the switch to 
linezolid.306  In this case, becoming generic may actually reduce the 
marketing pressures to prescribe vancomycin and allow the patented 
competitor to market without contradiction.  From a medical standpoint, 
this may mean less than optimal prescribing, as physicians act on a 
biased version of the medical evidence.  These marketing practices also 
weaken the patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2), since 
preserving linezolid for future use might better serve social welfare so 
long as vancomycin remains effective.  This is an interesting cross-class 
effect: In order for patent holder conservation (H2) to work, a single 
 
Skin and Skin-Structure Infections Associated with Surgical Procedures, 197 AM. J. SURGERY 
791 (2009).  For a summary of the ATTAIN 1 and ATTAIN 2 clinical studies, see Theravance 
Announces FDA Acceptance of Telavancin NDA for the Treatment of Hospital-Acquired 
Pneumonia, MED. NEWS TODAY, Apr. 12, 2009, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/ 
145436.php. 
 301 Theuretzbacher, supra note 293; Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 
560-61. 
 302 Arias & Murray, supra note 110, at 440-41. 
 303 See, e.g., Huang et al., supra note 202 (finding that routine surveillance for MRSA in the 
ICU followed by contact isolation of MRSA cases yielded a large and statistically significant 
reduction in MRSA bacteremia). 
 304 Paterson, supra note 85. 
 305 Id. at 487 (“However, there are two important caveats to these findings.  Firstly, these 
results are a subgroup analysis of a larger study that showed no overall difference between 
linezolid and vancomycin for hospital-acquired pneumonia.  Indeed, the FDA does not recognize 
claims of superiority of linezolid over vancomycin for this condition.  Secondly, the vancomycin 
dosage used in these studies was 1 g every 12 h given intravenously.  Many clinicians are now 
using larger doses of vancomycin and aiming for trough concentrations of vancomycin of ≤ 20 
mg/L.  A randomized trial is now underway comparing linezolid with higher doses of 
vancomycin for hospital-acquired pneumonia.”). 
 306 In the U.S. market, generic drug manufacturers do not market to physicians or consumers.  
Pharmacies generally dispense only one generic version of a particular drug. 
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company would need to hold exclusive rights to both vancomycin and 
linezolid.  Since intravenous vancomycin has been off patent since 
1980, patent holder conservation (H2) does not appear to be possible for 
linezolid. 
Other interesting incentive effects were at play with vancomycin 
and MRSA which support the resistance stimulates innovation 
hypothesis (H4).  The original patent (’099) was filed on September 16, 
1955.307  For many other successful drugs, the innovator company and 
others race to file follow-on patents for incremental improvements to 
the drug.  These drugs are sometimes derisively labeled “me-too” or 
“evergreen” drugs, but follow-on antibiotic innovation can improve 
important characteristics, such as reducing toxicity or improving 
mechanisms against resistance.  Vancomycin was not a successful drug 
at launch, or indeed for its first twenty-five years.  Eli Lilly apparently 
did not file follow-on patent applications for vancomycin until the early 
1980s.308  Eli Lilly resurrected a moribund research program as MRSA 
began to emerge.  The new patents included both process patents309 and 
compound patents on novel glycopeptides.310  As of 2009, vancomycin 
was still the only glycopeptide approved for use in the United States.  
The FDA recently denied Targanta’s application for a second 
glycopeptide (oritavancin), and that compound’s future remains 
uncertain.311  MRSA was responsible for resurrecting intravenous 
vancomycin. 
Veterinary use of glycopeptides (e.g., avoparcin) weakens the 
patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2), suggesting that a patent 
holder may not make decisions to maximize human health.  The small 
human market for vancomycin in the 1960s and 1970s led Eli Lilly to 
 
 307 U.S. Patent No. 3,067,099 (filed Sept. 16, 1955) (issued Dec. 4, 1962). 
 308 Most of the early patents citing the ’099 patent were from Eli Lilly & Company, including 
the first fourteen: U.S. Patent No. 4,440,753 (filed Mar. 15, 1982); U.S. Patent No. 4,462,942 
(filed July 30, 1982); U.S. Patent No. 4,495,179 (filed Dec. 16, 1983); U.S. Patent No. 4,537,770 
(filed Oct. 18, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,547,488 (filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,548,924 
(filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,548,925 (filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,552,701 
(filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,558,008 (filed Dec. 13, 1983); U.S. Patent No. 4,558,009 
(filed Dec. 27, 1983); U.S. Patent No. 4,559,323 (filed Aug. 2, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,604,239 
(filed June 11, 1985); U.S. Patent No. 4,639,433 (filed Aug. 14, 1985); U.S. Patent No. 4,643,987 
(filed Aug. 14, 1985).  All of these were filed in the early 1980s and issued from 1984 to 1987. 
 309 Including the ’753, ’942, and ’179 patents.  All of these patents were issued to Eli Lilly & 
Company. 
 310 These included the ’488, ’924, ’925, ’701, ’008, ’433, and ’987 patents and U.S. Patent No. 
4,698,327 (filed Apr. 18, 1986).  All of these patents were issued to Eli Lilly & Company. 
 311 Reuters, Targanta Drug Appears Similar to Rival—US FDA Staff, FORBES.COM, Nov. 17, 
2008, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/11/17/afx5703072.html.  Oritavancin was initially 
developed by Lilly, then out-licensed to InterMune, who finally sold it to Targanta.  Oritavancin 
was rejected by FDA in December 2008 due to lack of evidence of effectiveness in one of their 
studies that was done many years ago by Eli Lilly.  Targanta has been recently acquired by The 
Medicines Company and may (or not) plan a new Phase 3 program for oritavancin. 
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focus more on animal uses of glycopeptides, especially in Europe.312  
Eli Lilly’s research teams were focused on antibiotics for use in animal 
feeds, resulting in several patents filed in the mid- to late-1970s.313  In 
addition, several of the 1984-1987 flurry of Eli Lilly patents citing ’099 
were for animal growth promotion with low-dose antibiotics in feed.314  
Researchers have identified these growth promotion uses of 
glycopeptide antibiotics as troublesome for resistance.315  Europe has 
now banned their use, and the FDA also restricted the off-label use of 
glycopeptides in animals.316 
Eli Lilly deployed scientific uncertainty to claim they were not 
deliberately wasting glycopeptides through the sale of avoparcin animal 
feeds.  The company raised skeptical questions about the scientific 
evidence for human resistance through the animal feed mechanism.  In 
1998, three Lilly scientists wrote: “In view of these data, the need to 
invoke a second mechanism for the spread of vancomycin-resistant 
bacteria in humans due to avoparcin use in Europe remains open to 
debate.”317  Eli Lilly eventually lost this debate.318  These events weaken 
 
 312 Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1303 (noting that avoparcin, an animal feed glycopeptide, 
was never approved in the United States but was widely used in Europe). 
 313 U.S. Patent No. 4,083,964 (filed Sept. 13, 1976) (issued Apr. 11, 1978) (increasing feed 
efficiency through antibiotics in animal feed); U.S. Patent No. 4,122,168 (filed May 23, 1977) 
(issued Oct. 24, 1978) (detailing new antibiotic A-35512, useful as an antibiotic against dental 
caries and for growth promotion in animal feed); U.S. Patent No. 4,331,594 (filed Nov. 14, 1980) 
(issued May 25, 1982) (detailing new antibiotic A-21978, an antibacterial agent and useful in 
growth promotion in poultry).  All of these patents were assigned to Eli Lilly and Company. 
 314 Including the ’770, ’323, ’239, ’545, and ’331 patents.  All of these patents were issued to 
Eli Lilly & Company. 
 315 Frank Møller Aarestrup et al., Glycopeptide Susceptibility Among Danish Enterococcus 
faecium and Enterococcus faecalis Isolates of Animal and Human Origin and PCR Identification 
of Genes Within the VanA Cluster, 40 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1938 (1996); 
A.E. Van den Bogaard et al., High Prevalence of Colonization with Vancomycin- and 
Pristinamycin-Resistant Enterococci in Healthy Humans and Pigs in the Netherlands: Is the 
Addition of Antibiotics to Animal Feeds to Blame?, 40 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 454 
(1997); W. Witte, Impact of Antibiotic Use in Animal Feeding on Resistance of Bacterial 
Pathogens in Humans, in ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, SELECTION AND 
SPREAD (Derek Chadwick & Jaime Goode eds., 1997).  But see Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 
1303 (noting the lack of relationship between animal glycopeptide use in Europe and resistance to 
vancomycin).  For studies on other antibiotic classes used in animal feeds, see H. GREGG 
CLAYCAMP & BARRY H. HOOBERMAN, FDA CENTER FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE, 
VIRGINIAMYCIN RISK ASSESSMENT: RISK ASSESSMENT OF STREPTOGRAMIN RESISTANCE IN 
ENTEROCOCCUS FAECIUM ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE USE OF STREPTOGRAMINS IN ANIMALS (Nov. 
23, 2004) (draft for comment), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/ 
CVMUpdates/UCM054722.pdf. 
 316 Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Fluoroquinolones and Glycopeptides; Order of Prohibition, 
62 Fed. Reg. 27,944 (May 22, 1997) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 530.41 (2009)).  For a 
recent overview, see Terence J. Centner, Regulating the Use of Non-Therapeutic Antibiotics in 
Food Animals, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2008); see also David L. Smith et al., Animal 
Antibiotic Use Has an Early but Important Impact on the Emergence of Antibiotic Resistance in 
Human Commensal Bacteria, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6343 (2002). 
 317 Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1304. 
 318 The evidence is stronger today on the linkage between antibiotic use in animals and the 
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the patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2).  Drug companies may 
not be trustworthy as long-term stewards of antibiotics, even in the 
absence of generic competition. 
Eli Lilly’s animal feed research program also requires a 
modification to the patent holder waste hypothesis (H1): Facing a small 
and temporarily unimportant human market, the company had no reason 
to conserve vancomycin and could profit from sales in animal feeds.  If 
waste occurred here,319 the cause was the small human market, not the 
time-limited nature of patents.  A longer term on the ’099 patent would 
not have delayed Eli Lilly’s diversification given the small human 
market.  This is an important constraint on using this data to support 
longer patent terms. 
 
B.     Class Coordination 
 
Vancomycin also presents a natural illustration of the difficulties of 
class coordination, which would be required for patent holder 
conservation (H2).  A solution to the resistance problem discussed by 
some is to expand antibiotic patent scope to encompass the entire class, 
giving full ownership of the class to a single company or a group of 
companies operating a patent pool under an antitrust waiver.320  In this 
world, Eli Lilly would have had a perpetual patent on all 
glycopeptides.321  These proposals raise a host of issues, some of which 
I have discussed previously.322  Class-based patents are an unwieldy 
path to continued antibiotic effectiveness. 
 
transfer of mobile genetic elements of resistance to the human population through the global food 
trade.  Remi M. Ajiboye et al., Global Spread of Mobile Antimicrobial Drug Resistance 
Determinants in Human and Animal Escherichia coli and Salmonella Strains Causing 
Community-Acquired Infections, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 365, 370 (2009) (“These 
data suggest that food-producing animals are a major reservoir for integrons carrying 
antimicrobial drug-resistant genes.”); Ellie Herschberger et al., Quinupristin-Dalfopristin 
Resistance in Gram-Positive Bacteria: Mechanism of Resistance and Epidemiology, 38 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92, 96 (2004) (“Considering the effect that antimicrobial resistance as on 
human health and also its economic impact, measures to preserve these agents and delay the 
development of resistance are urgently needed.  This includes judicial use of antibiotics for 
infection in humans, control measures to prevent the spread of resistant pathogens in health care 
facilities, and the decrease of resistance in reservoirs such as the environment and animal 
husbandry.”). 
 319 Waste is difficult to prove in agricultural uses because the relationship between agricultural 
use and human infection with resistant bacteria is complex and occasionally counterintuitive.  See 
Marc Lipsitch, Randall S. Singer & Bruce R. Levin, Antibiotics in Agriculture: When Is It Time to 
Close the Barn Door?, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5752 (2002). 
 320 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 13; Laxminarayan, Scope of Antibiotic Patents, 
supra note 51.  For prior critiques of this concept, see Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, 
supra note 4, at 94-99; and Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563. 
 321 Ironically, Eli Lilly discovered and out-licensed vancomycin, oritavancin, and daptomycin. 
 322 Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 94-99; Outterson et al., 
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As discussed in Part IV.A.1 supra, Eli Lilly effectively controlled 
the glycopeptide class but did not act to conserve it.  To the contrary, it 
fragmented property rights in the class through licensing.  Nevertheless, 
it might be possible empirically to test patent holder conservation (H2) 
with vancomycin.  In the United States, vancomycin has never faced 
patented competition within the glycopeptide class,323 but in Europe, a 
second glycopeptide has been marketed for several years.  If patent 
holder conservation (H2) on a class basis was an effective strategy, one 
hypothesis worth testing would be a comparison of the U.S. and E.U. 
glycopeptide markets.  The patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2) 
would predict less resistance in the United States and more resistance 
within the glycopeptide class in Europe over the past decades since 
Europe has faced competition within the class.  Older data on 
comparative glycopeptide resistance levels in the United States and 
Europe do not give a clear result.324  Perhaps other factors such as 
conservation efforts in Europe have offset any patent holder waste 
effect.325  An empirical study should be undertaken to resolve this 
question. 
Class-based resistance also afflicts fluoroquinolones.  The leading 
hospital antibiotic, levofloxacin, is a member of the fluoroquinolone 
class,326 as is ciprofloxacin (Cipro®), a major generic antibiotic.  From 
current medical evidence on resistance, a patent-based conservation 
strategy to protect levofloxacin may well require the “re-patenting” of 
ciprofloxacin,327 which recently entered the public domain, and perhaps 
other members of the fluoroquinolone class.  While this would be a 
boon to levofloxacin’s patent owner (Ortho McNeil), it would raise 
many legal and practical problems.  First, granting class-based antibiotic 
patents is a quite radical departure from existing practice, dramatically 
widening the scope of patents.  Second, re-patenting public domain 
ciprofloxacin might be quite difficult.  Generic ciprofloxacin is a global 
best seller, with many manufacturers in multiple countries.  Third, 
 
Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563. 
 323 Oritavancin is not yet approved in the United States.  U.S. FDA, Orange Book, supra note 
233 (searching for “oritavancin” returns no hits) (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).  Another 
glycopeptides is teicoplanin (marketed in Europe by sanofi-aventis as Targocid®).  It has been 
used for many years outside the United States.  
 324 Compare Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1303-04, with Henrik Caspar Wegener, Historical 
Yearly Usage of Glycopeptides for Animals and Humans: The American-European Paradox 
Revisited, 42 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 3049 (1998). 
 325 Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1303-04 (explaining that Europe controls the hospital use of 
vancomycin more tightly than the United States). 
 326 Levofloxacin is the leading antibiotic used in U.S. hospitals.  MacDougall & Polk, supra 
note 125. 
 327 Re-patenting is not possible under existing law; this discussion is theoretical.  Bayer would 
also need to control its copyrights and trademarks in Cipro®, even if it had allowed them to lapse 
during the unpatented period. 
OUTTERSON.31-3 1/28/2010  6:09:35 PM 
2010]      LEGAL ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE  673 
mathematical models of resistance do not clearly specify the best course 
of action for class coordination; it seems likely that class coordination 
actions designed to minimize resistance would expand the risk of 
treatment failure in particular patients, an unsavory dilemma.328  Finally, 
the Constitutional basis for re-patenting the public domain seems open 
to challenge.  As interesting as these issues are, we will save them for 
another day, for at present Congress does not appear interested in class-
based patents or re-patenting the public domain. 
One complicating factor for patent holder conservation is the 
ability of drugs to create resistance in other antibiotic classes.329  
Vancomycin is associated with increased resistance to daptomycin.330  
Daptomycin is the first-in-class lipopeptide, also discovered by Eli 
Lilly, but now licensed to Cubist Pharmaceuticals; daptomycin entered 
the U.S. market in 2003 as Cubicin®.331  These two drugs (vancomycin 
and daptomycin) are in different classes (glycopeptides and 
lipopeptides, respectively), and vancomycin has been generic for 
decades.  Patent-based coordination would be very difficult between 
these drugs.  Class-based coordination to protect daptomycin would 
require giving Cubist Pharmaceuticals patent control over both 
lipopeptides and glycopeptides, privatizing both the public domain 
(vancomycin) and taking by eminent domain or compulsory license all 
ongoing research projects by other companies in these classes, such as 
Theravance’s telavancin, a glycopeptide for which Theravance is 
currently seeking FDA approval, and oritavancin, a glycopeptide 
controlled by Targanta for which the company is also seeking FDA 
approval. 
A final interesting point is that the need to coordinate resistance 
between vancomycin and daptomycin could have been avoided:  Eli 
Lilly & Company discovered both compounds but chose to fragment the 
rights—licensing oral vancomycin to ViroPharma for U.S. use only 
(geographical fragmentation), and licensing daptomycin to Cubist 
Pharmaceuticals (class-based fragmentation).  In both cases, it may be 
presumed that Eli Lilly was well positioned to understand these drugs; 
in fact, it probably had the best information available concerning its 
discoveries.  And yet Lilly chose to fragment its rights voluntarily.  It is 
hard to reconcile this history with H2 (patent holder conservation); at 
the very least, we cannot assume that a single patent holder will 
conserve an antibiotic class through superior coordination. 
 
 328 Y. Claire Wang & Marc Lipsitch, Upgrading Antibiotic Use Within a Class: Tradeoff 
Between Resistance and Treatment Success, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9655 (2006). 
 329 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 94-99 (collecting sources). 
 330 Pakyz et al., supra note 125; Jean B. Patel et al., An Association Between Reduced 
Susceptibility to Daptomycin and Reduced Susceptibility to Vancomycin in Staphylococcus 
aureus, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1652 (2006). 
 331 Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 560. 
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C.     Comparing Hypotheses to the Vancomycin Case Study 
 
From the foregoing discussion of vancomycin, we can summarize 
in Table 3 several conclusions about the seven hypotheses. 
 
Table 3.  Case Study Results Regarding Vancomycin and Other 
Antibiotics 
 
Hypothesis Case Study Results 
H1. Patent holder waste  • Patent holders’ actions with 
vancomycin do not appear to fit the 
patent holder waste paradigm, as the 
patent had already expired  
• Even with non-patent barriers, the 
actions of the sole marketer of 
vancomycin were not consistent with 
patent holder waste 
• Drug companies may have sold some 
antibiotics without much regard to 
resistance, but the impact on 
vancomycin resistance during the 
patent term was small, so waste was 
not created  
• Marketing by the patent owner 
typically declines in the last few years 
of patent life, which is contrary to H1 
H2. Patent holder 
conservation  
• Little evidence was found that patent 
holders exercised long-term 
stewardship to conserve vancomycin 
• Eli Lilly did not promote class-based 
conservation, but fragmented property 
rights 
• Generic entry might actually decrease 
sales when brand name marketing is 
suspended  
H3. Patent incentives are 
inadequate for production  
• Market demand and medical need for 
vancomycin were more important than 
patent incentives 
• Reimbursement may be a more 
effective policy lever than patent law 
• Non-patent barriers to free-riding can 
be important 
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H4. Resistance stimulates 
innovation  
• Penicillin and methicillin resistance 
stimulated the development of 
vancomycin  
• MRSA and CDAD greatly stimulated 
the vancomycin market 
• MRSA stimulated many new research 
programs, anticipating resistance to 
vancomycin 
H5. Conservation 
dampens production 
• Conservation reduces unit sales, but 
may promote overall social welfare  
• Most of the conservation of 
vancomycin was not deliberate policy, 
but the result of environmental factors 
such as available substitutes in the 
early years with fewer side effects 
H6. Excessive regulation 
dampens production  
• Not examined here, as the FDA 
regulations in question arose largely 
after vancomycin reached the market 
H7. Antibiotic 
externalities are 
predominantly negative 
• CDAD, and to a lesser extent, MRSA 
are negative effects of antibiotic use 
that directly harm the patient taking 
antibiotics 
• Both CDAD and MRSA also generate 
negative externalities beyond 
particular patients and institutions as 
resistant infections spread to others  
• Proper internalization of antibiotic 
costs to the patient often fails due to 
information deficiencies 
• Some MRSA- and CDAD-related 
germ-shed externalities will be 
positive under conservation programs  
 
Patent holder waste (H1) and patent holder conservation (H2) 
emerge from this case study having sustained significant damage.  
Patent holders did not appear to engage in waste near the end of the 
patent term, but they also did not carefully nurture important antibiotics 
for the long-term good of society.  Generic entry may not be the 
resistance disaster that some assume, as marketing pressures subside in 
the last few years of patent life and thereafter.  In any case, one cannot 
make a case for longer patents as a conservation tool based on the 
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vancomycin experience.  Sales data from other leading hospital 
antibiotics bolstered the conclusions from vancomycin.332 
The vancomycin case study strongly challenges the third 
hypothesis (H3, patent incentives are inadequate for production).  The 
shorter seventeen-year patent term333 was sufficient for the discovery 
and commercialization of vancomycin without additional incentives,334 
and non-patent incentives such as FDA rules relating to marketing 
approval protected follow-on innovation.  More importantly, market 
demand was more significant than patent status for vancomycin.  
Patents proved inadequate when medical need did not materialize, and 
once the medical need was clear, the patents had expired.  This evidence 
should be considered in light of the broken market linkages between 
medical need and actual reimbursement to drug companies, as discussed 
in Part III.C.  If the goal is improved health on a population basis, 
modifying patents will have little benefit so long as reimbursement is 
not sufficiently tied to medical need.335  The vancomycin case study 
suggests that if reimbursement is sufficient, patents will be less 
important.  Perhaps H3 should be modified with three plausible 
extensions for antibiotic markets: 
• H3a: Reimbursement incentives are inadequate for production; 
• H3b: Reimbursement is a powerful policy lever for production; 
and 
• H3c: Reimbursement policy is more important than patent 
policy. 
This Article does not go so far as to claim to have firmly established 
any of these alternative hypotheses, but it offers them for further study 
in light of the vancomycin experience. 
The evidence is strong for the hypothesis that resistance stimulates 
innovation (H4), which indeed is central to the history of vancomycin 
for both CDAD and MRSA.  These results are consistent with the 
theoretical analysis in Part III.A, and they upend conventional wisdom 
from the IDSA and similar policy advisors.  Resistance is not a 
hindrance to innovation, but actually promotes it. 
The fifth hypothesis (H5, conservation dampens production) 
appears to be correct, but most of the U.S. market response to 
vancomycin followed external environmental factors other than policy-
driven conservation.  The experience with vancomycin is not 
inconsistent with this claim; this claim is simply unproven.  The 
 
 332 See supra Chart 1 and accompanying text. 
 333 At the time, patent terms in the United States were seventeen years from issue.  After 
adoption of the World Trade Organization TRIPS Agreement in 1994, the United States changed 
its patent term to twenty years from filing. 
 334 This statement approaches a tautology in a study of a commercialized drug. 
 335 See Projan, supra note 74; Wenzel, supra note 2. 
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theoretical analysis in Part III.B also challenges the policy impact of 
H5, suggesting that conservation may actually promote socially 
valuable outcomes. 
Through an accident of history, vancomycin was set aside for 
decades.  The tantalizing question is whether we can deliberately 
replicate these conditions for other important antibiotics.  One possible 
approach would be a public purchase of the patent at a generous price 
commensurate with the value of the drug.  The companies would be 
paid for their valuable patents based on a prize model rather than 
through current sales.  For a generic drug like vancomycin, to the extent 
we are concerned about post-patent waste, the federal government could 
assert control without the need to compensate a patent holder.  A few 
important antibiotics should be put on the shelf for decades and reserved 
only for the most extreme cases, creating a Strategic Antibiotic 
Reserve.336 
The sixth hypothesis (H6, excessive regulation dampens 
production) was not a significant factor with vancomycin, as 
vancomycin reached the market many years before the relevant FDA 
regulations. 
Finally, hypothesis H7 (antibiotic externalities are largely 
negative) remains an open question, although some interesting questions 
have been raised.  If Medicare begins to punish hospitals financially for 
MRSA infections, the externalities of hospital infection control will 
become a much more salient topic.  It also appears that some major 
costs are actually internal but go unrecognized by patients, physicians, 
and institutions due to a lack of information.  The solution here would 
be better information on the negative consequences of consuming 
antibiotics; this information is not likely to come from the patent 
holders.  Finally, some conservation programs will generate positive 
externalities within a germ-shed.337 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article reminds us to test theory against experience.  It is said 
that battle plans often fail to survive first contact with the enemy.  In the 
present study, the case study with vancomycin calls for significant 
changes to our theoretical models. 
When faced with a common pool resource problem, context 
matters.  We should not reflexively choose solutions from our favorite 
 
 336 See supra note 46 and sources cited therein. 
 337 See supra note 100 and sources cited therein. 
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Sector, but must evaluate which tools will be most effective in the 
specific situation. 
For antibiotics, the conventional wisdom emphasizes IP-based 
solutions.  This Article counsels caution before we expand antibiotic 
intellectual property rights, lest our good intentions result in a 
counterproductive reduction in antibacterial effectiveness.  The most 
effective and immediate solutions might be based on conservation rather 
than production, and on reimbursement rather than patent law. 
